Research update, Spring 2018 by Banco de España
The Banco de España is pleased to announce the release of the Spring 2018 issue of its Research Update. The 
Update aims to inform both academic and policy-oriented economists and financial specialists about publications, 
conferences, and other research activities at the Banco de España. 
As usual, this issue includes several feature articles summarizing policy-relevant findings from recent Banco de 
España projects in diverse areas of research. First, I. Argimón compares the results of international diversification 
across different Spanish banking groups, concluding that groups with a more decentralized business model have 
proved less risky. Second, G. Ganics presents a methodology for optimally combining several competing economic 
forecasts. Next, O. Bover, L. Hospido, and E. Villanueva evaluate the impact of a financial literacy course administered 
by the Banco de España in a sample of Spanish high schools, showing that the course persistently improved 
financial knowledge and increased measures of patience. Fourth, A. Abbate and D. Thaler discuss a macroeconomic 
model of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, arguing that interest rate smoothing may improve welfare in an 
economy where low interest rates encourage excessively risky investment. Finally, L. Alfaro, M. García-Santana, and 
E. Moral-Benito link microdata on bank loans to Spanish input-output data to document both the direct effects of 
credit supply shocks on firms’ employment, output, and investment, and the indirect effects of these shocks on 
firms’ customers and suppliers. 
Moreover, this Update reports on other Banco de España research news, such as recent publications, current 
conferences and our latest visiting scholars. This issue also includes an interview with S. Mayordomo and M. 
Rodríguez-Moreno discussing how microeconometric studies can shed light on financial stability and macroprudential 
policy today.
We highlight these and other research developments at the Banco de España in hopes that they will interest the 
broader research community, in Spain and internationally, and thereby contribute to an improved understanding of 
economic policy.
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FEaturEs
dEcEntralizEd multinational Banks and risk taking: 
thE spanish ExpEriEncE in thE crisis
SUMMARY OF BANCO DE ESPAÑA WORKING PAPER Nº 1749
ISABEL ARGIMóN
Using banking supervisory data, this study finds that 
international diversification helps lower the riskiness of 
Spanish banking groups.  In theory, international 
activity could be a source of risk diversification, 
especially in stressful times, but alternatively, it could 
also lead banks to assume greater risk, either by 
diversifying into high-risk activities or, among other 
hypotheses, because of the difficulty of monitoring 
distant affiliates abroad. Our estimates identify three 
channels by which international diversification lowers 
banks’ default risk: greater geographic diversification, 
less output growth synchronization across markets, 
and an international business model characterized 
especially by subsidiaries with substantial funding 
autonomy and a high weight of local claims which are 
mostly financed with local liabilities.
introduction
The literature has failed to provide clear evidence on the 
direction of the effect of banks’ geographic diversification 
on their risk. In accordance with portfolio theory, banks 
see diversification, ceteris paribus, as an opportunity to 
improve their risk-return trade-off, so that risk-adjusted 
returns should be higher at more diversified banks. 
However, if this lowers the variability of their net income 
to assets, banks may react by decreasing their 
capital-to-assets ratio or their expected net income to 
assets. Moreover, diversification might extend into 
higher risk activities. Thus, the question of whether 
diversified financial institutions outperform their more 
concentrated peers has been widely studied, with 
mixed results.1
International banking has increased with economic 
globalization, following different patterns in different 
economies. In general, direct cross-border lending 
(lending from headquarters to residents in other 
jurisdictions) as a share of total banking assets has 
declined since the crisis, while the share of local lending 
by bank affiliates that operate abroad has remained 
steady (IMF, 2015).2 
The Spanish banking system stands out as the one with 
the largest share of local activity among the major 
banking systems (McCauley et al., 2010). Since the 
crisis, it has been characterised by an increasing weight 
of foreign activity in the consolidated results of banking 
groups. At the bank level, the mode of entry into foreign 
markets varies substantially. While the vast majority of 
Spanish banks carry out their international lending 
activity by establishing branches or even without setting 
up affiliates abroad, the largest banks tend to establish 
subsidiaries abroad with a lot of financial autonomy and 
very little intragroup funding.
This article addresses the relevance of banks’ 
international business model, and the effects of 
geographic diversification and business cycle 
synchronization on banks’ riskiness, using confidential 
Spanish supervisory data. It also provides empirical 
1  See, for example, Saunders and Walters (1994), DeYoung 
and Roland (2001), Stiroh (2004), and Lepetit et al., (2007).
2  Here, "local lending" means lending to the residents in a 
given country by either branches or subsidiaries of the 
consolidated group in that country.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, based on Banco de España supervisory data.
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receiving the lending at time t. The weights are the lagged 
share of the counterparty country’s assets in the total 
assets of bank i. Synchronization is measured as the 
negative absolute difference between the two countries' 
real GDP growth rates, so higher values of the index (closer 
to zero) indicate a higher degree of bilateral synchronization 
between Spain and country j in year t.
The variables multidivi,t–k are several indicators capturing 
different modes of entry into foreign markets (McCauley 
et al., 2010, and Gambacorta and van Rixtel, 2013).3 On 
the claims side, we distinguish  “multinational” banks, 
characterized by the predominance of local business 
(either through branches or subsidiaries), from 
“international” banks which operate out of the home 
country and conduct mostly cross-border business. We 
proxy this dimension by the ratio of local claims over 
total foreign claims (multi). The higher the value of the 
variable multi, the closer the bank is to following a 
multinational model. 
On the liabilities side, we distinguish between a 
“centralized” bank, which raises funds at the country 
where its headquarters is and redistributes them around 
the group, and a “decentralized” bank, which has 
affiliates abroad that raise funds locally to finance local 
activity. Decentralization is linked to where the bank 
raises funds, so we proxy it by the ratio of total local 
liabilities over total foreign claims (decentral). The larger 
the value of the ratio, the more decentralized the bank 
is. Besides multi and decentral, we also include their 
product, multi*decentral, in the business model indicator 
multidiv.
We estimate coefficients λ3 and λ4 which will provide a 
test for the differential impact that these modes of 
international expansion have on the determinants 
of bank risk in an international environment. If the 
estimated coefficient λ3 is positive it implies that 
the more multinational or decentralized a bank is, the 
larger the positive impact of geographic diversification 
on that bank’s resilience. If λ4 is positive, this implies 
that a more multinational or decentralized business 
model attenuates the negative impact of synchronization 
on the bank's resilience, which would reinforce the idea 
that international geographic diversification is 
associated with higher resilience.
evidence on whether the impact on risk during 
the recent crisis depended on the international 
business model.
Empirical approach
We analyse the relevance of these factors linked to 
geographic diversification on bank’s resilience by 
means of an OLS regression. We proxy resilience by the 
Z-score, which can be interpreted as a distance-to-
default measure. The Z-score of bank i at time t is 
calculated as:
where ROA is the average return on assets, E/A is the 
average equity to assets ratio and δROA is the standard 
deviation of return on assets, which are all computed 
over the k periods from t–k+1 to t (12 quarters). A high 
Z-score indicates that returns and capital are 
high relative to the volatility of returns, implying a safer 
bank. Although this indicator has limitations as a risk 
measure, it has the advantage that it can be defined for 
non-listed institutions, which constitute the majority of 
our sample.
Formally, we estimate equations wich include some 
combination of the following terms:
where the right-hand-side variables are measured at 
period t–k to ensure that they are predetermined in 
relation to the dependent variable.
Here HHi,t is an indicator of international geographic 
diversification, which is obtained as a Hirsch-Herfindhal 
index:
where Ri,t is the total number of jurisdictions j where bank i 
operates, including the home country. The HH index lies 
between zero and one; the lower bound corresponds to a 
purely domestic bank, and the upper bound corresponds 
to the most internationally diversified bank. If international 
geographic diversification is associated to higher resilience, 
we can expect a positive coefficient in regression (1). 
The variable synchroi,t is a weighted index of 
synchronization or correlation between the business 
cycle of Spain and the country of residence of those 
2
3  McCauley et al. (2010) do not center the distinction in the 
two sides of the balance sheet. They also use the share of 
foreign liabilities booked outside the home country to 
distinguish between international and multinational banks. 
They distinguish centralized banks from decentralized 
multinational banks by the extent to which local assets are 
locally funded.
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period to 2002Q4. We use consolidated financial 
statements that include the activity corresponding to 
subsidiaries and other affiliates abroad, and we merge 
them with the statements provided for each country 
where the group has affiliates or to which it provides 
loans. Our final database consists of 66 banks. Five of 
them engaged in international activity through 
subsidiaries at all times during the period of analysis. 
Twelve banks never had any international activity. We 
distinguish among 34 different jurisdictions for which 
we have information on macrovariables.
Results
The findings in Table 1 provide support for the hypothesis 
that internationalization helps reduce risk. Under all the 
specifications, either the HH index has a positive coefficient, 
as under the baseline specification in column 1, 
We also include control variables, Xi,t , both at the bank 
and the time dimension, which include an index of the 
bank’s income diversity, a measure of overhead costs 
and the bank’s size. Finally, we also include time and 
bank fixed effects in all specifications.
data
We use quarterly balance sheet data and income 
statements submitted by Spanish banks to the Banco 
de España. We consider as international activity both 
cross-border activity, and all the activity developed by 
the affiliates operating abroad that are classified as 
credit institutions or financial institutions. 
The sample is an unbalanced panel of banks spanning 
from 1999Q4 to 2014Q4, although the lag structure of 
the definition of our risk variable limits the starting 
NOTES: (*) All specifications include bank and time dummies. See Working Paper 1749 for a complete list of regressors.
(1) z-score is computed as the sum of the mean return on assets (net income over total assets) and the mean capitalization ratio (equity over total assets) divided 
by the standard deviation of the return on assets, over a 12 quarter period. Robust p-values in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable:
All banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HHi,t-12 0.852*** 0.441 0.474* 0.499* -0.0590 0.101 0.136
(0.00244) (0.114) (0.0907) (0.0758) (0.839) (0.732) (0.643)
synchroi,t-12 -0.132 -0.271*** -0.241** -0.200** -0.574*** -0.620*** -0.572***
(0.126) (0.00412) (0.0120) (0.0369) (0.00670) (0.00452) (0.00597)
multii,t-12 -0.00369  
(0.207)  
decentrali,t-12 0.00216
(multi*decentral)i,t-12 0.000132**
-0.0161    
(multi*HH)i,t-12 0.0756***   
(0)   
(multi*synchro)i,t-12 0.00958***   
(0.000518)   
(decentral*HH)i,t-12 0.0289***  
(1.02e-05)  
(decentral*synchro)i,t-12 0.00712**  
-0.0169  
(multi*decentral*HH)i,t-12 0.000579***
-1.03E-09
(multi*decentral*synchro)i,t-12 0.000109***
-0.0035
Observations 2,155 1,941 1,928 1,928 1,941 1,928 1,928
Adjusted R2 0.656 0.602 0.6 0.6 0.61 0.603 0.604
Regressors
Only banks with foreign claims
Logarithm of z-score (1)
RISK AND INTERNATIONAL BANKING MODEL. (1999Q4-2014Q4) (*) TABLE 1
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Conclusions
Internationally active banking groups have been increasing 
in size and complexity, and since the crisis they have been 
subject to tighter regulatory requirements, aiming at better 
aligning regulatory capital to actual risk. 
The evidence presented in this study suggests that 
while geographic diversification affects banks’ ex post 
risk, their international business model and the cyclical 
synchronization of the countries where they do business 
matters too.  These findings, like those of Gotz et al. 
(2016) and Griffith-Jones et al. (2002), provide supporting 
evidence for proposals to incorporate the benefits of 
international diversification into the regulatory 
framework. Proper alignment of capital requirements 
with risk would suggest rewarding geographic 
diversification with lower capital. The findings also 
suggest that regulators should take account of banks’ 
international business models. The evidence on the 
higher resilience of multinational-decentralized banks, 
especially during the crisis, suggests considering these 
characteristics when assessing global banks and their 
capital requirements, and when treating the Multiple 
Point of Entry models for resolution. This evidence also 
calls for a reconsideration of the level of detail used in 
stress tests, which have become a key tool of 
supervisory policy since 2008. Detailed scenarios for 
different geographical regions, taking into account their 
expected cyclical synchronization, could consider the 
joint probabilities of different local stress scenarios. 
 and/or the synchronization index has a negative coefficient, 
as in the remaining columns. These results indicate that 
greater geographical diversification, and lower business 
cycle synchronization of the countries represented in a 
bank's portfolio, both reduce a bank's risk.
We do not find evidence that more decentralized or 
more multinational banks show lower risk on average, 
as the coefficients on multi and decentral are not 
statistically significant (cols. 2 and 3). However, we find 
that the product of the two variables (the multiplicative 
variable multi*decentral) has a positive effect on 
resilience (col. 4), so being more decentralized and 
multinational at the same time reduces risk. 
Moreover, the results also show that the more 
multinational (col. 5) or the more decentralised the 
bank is (col. 6), the greater is the positive impact of 
geographic diversification on resilience, as captured 
by the statistically significant coefficients for the cross 
terms of the bank’s international business model with 
the HH index. The results in columns 5 and 6 show 
that if it were not for these types of banks, the effect of 
geographic diversification would be nil. We also find 
that the negative effect of business synchronization on 
resilience is reduced by a decentralized or multinational 
structure. The same qualitative results hold for the 
multiplicative multinational and decentralized banks 
indicator (col. 7). Therefore, we find that decentralized 
multinational banks have lower risk through 
more effective geographic diversification and 
a mitigating effect on synchronization.
Table 2 reports the results obtained when we examine 
how internationalization affects risk during the 
financial crisis. We first split the sample in two, with 
observations up to the third quarter of 2008 and 
observations from then onwards and run separate 
regressions of equation (1) for the two periods. We 
then define the dummy variable crisis that takes value 
zero up to the third term of 2008 and one thereafter, 
and include the interaction terms decentralized*crisis 
and multinational*crisis using the whole sample to 
test whether these types of banks were more resilient 
in the crisis than their peers.
The estimates reported in column 1 and 2 show that banks 
which are both decentralized and multinational had lower 
risk than their competitors both before and after the crisis. 
The direct comparison of the two periods using the whole 
sample (col. 3) shows that during the crisis, these banks 
had higher resilience. Therefore, the evidence shows that 
during the crisis, banks that were more decentralized 
and more multinational were more resilient than their 
peers, and therefore further away from default.
NOTES: (*) All specifications include bank and time dummies. See Working 
Paper 1749 for a complete list of regressors.
(1) z-score is computed as the sum of the mean return on assets (net income 
over total assets) and the mean capitalization ratio (equity over total assets) 
divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets, over a 12 quarter 
period. Robust p-values in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
TABLE 2
Dependent variable:
Before crisis After crisis Overall
Regressors (1) (2) (3)
HHi,t-12 0.760**  0.814*  0.191
)294.0( )6850.0( )0620.0( 
synchroi,t-12 -0.214*  -0.117  -0.255***
)24400.0( )412.0( )4380.0( 
(multi*decentral)i,t-12 0.000226***  0.000249***  1.60e-06
)679.0( )002000.0( )63800.0( 
(crisis*multi*decentral)i,t-12     0.000143***
    (0)
Observations 1,199  729  1,931
Adjusted R2 0.602  0.733  0.610
Logarithm of z-score (1)
MULTINATIONAL AND DECENTRALIZED BANKS
BEFORE AND AFTER 2008Q3. (1999Q4-2014Q4) (*)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 RESEaRCh updaTE, SpRiNg 2018
REfERENCES
DEYOUNG, R., and K. P. ROLAND (2001). “Product mix 
and earnings volatility at commercial banks: evidence 
from a degree of total leverage model” Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 10 (1), 55-84.
GAMBACORTA, L., and A. VAN RIxTEL (2013). 
“Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives: Approaches 
and Implications”. BIS WP 412.
GOETz, M. R., L. LAEVEN and L. LEVINE (2016). 
“Does the geographic expansion of banks reduce 
risk?” Journal of Financial Economics, 120 (2), 
346-362.
GRIFFITH-JONES, S., M. SEGOVIANO and S. SPRATT.
(2002). “Basel II and developing countries: diversification 
and portfolio effects”. Manuscript, London School 
of Economics.
IMF (2015). April 2015 Global Financial Stability Report, 
Chapter 2. “International banking after the crisis- 
Increasingly local and safer?”, April 2015.
LEPETIT, L., E. NYS, P. ROUS and A. TARAzI (2007). 
“Bank income structure and risk: An empirical 
analysis of European banks”, Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 32 (8), 1452-1467.
MCCAULEY, R., P. MCGUIRE and G. VON PETER 
(2010). “The architecture of global banking: from 
international to multinational? BIS Quarterly Review, 
March 2010, 25-37.
SAUNDERS, A., and I. WALTER (1994). Universal 
banking in the United States: what could we gain? 
What could we lose? Oxford University Press.
STIROH, K. J., 2004. Diversification in banking: is 
noninterest income the answer? Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 36 (5), 853-882. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 8 RESEaRCh updaTE, SpRiNg 2018
optimal dEnsity ForEcast comBinations
SUMMARY OF BANCO DE ESPAÑA WORKING PAPER Nº 1751
GERGELY GANICS
How should researchers combine several predictive 
densities to improve their forecasts? This paper 
proposes consistent estimators of weights which deliver 
density forecast combinations approximating the true 
predictive density, and confirms that the proposed 
methods work well through Monte Carlo simulations. In 
an empirical example of forecasting monthly US 
industrial production, the method delivers density 
forecasts which are superior to well-known benchmarks, 
such as an equal weights scheme. Specifically, housing 
permits had valuable predictive power before and after 
the Great Recession, and stock returns and corporate 
bond spreads proved to be useful predictors during the 
recent crisis.
introduction
Researchers and policy makers seeking to predict 
future economic conditions often need to go beyond 
simple point forecasts of an economic time series. As 
Alan Greenspan stated, “a central bank needs to 
consider not only the most likely future path for the 
economy, but also the distribution of possible outcomes 
about that path” (Greenspan, 2004, p. 37). For this 
reason, density forecasts (also called distribution 
forecasts) – which describe the conditional probability 
distribution of a time series, instead of just describing 
its conditional mean – have become increasingly 
popular both in the academic literature and among 
professional forecasters. Well-known examples of 
forecasts produced in this spirit include the fan charts 
of the Bank of England, and the Surveys of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia and the European Central Bank.
Moreover, forecasters often have several competing 
predictions available for the same time series. Just as 
combinations of individual point forecasts have been 
found to be superior against a single point forecast in 
many settings, density combinations have been shown 
to outperform the density forecasts of individual models 
(Elliott and Timmermann, 2016; Timmermann, 2006). 
The reasons for both are largely the same: model 
misspecification, structural breaks and parameter 
estimation uncertainty complicate the task of producing 
reliable forecasts. Practitioners often rely on simple 
rules or expert judgment to combine point forecasts. 
But convex combinations of densities can take shapes 
that are dissimilar to their individual components, 
resulting in considerably different predictions. This 
makes density forecast combination a more challenging 
task than the combination of point forecasts. While 
assigning equal weights to predictive densities often 
results in improvements (see e.g. Rossi and 
Sekhposyan, 2014), this does not offer insights into the 
individual models' performance. In contrast, the data-
driven weighting scheme proposed in this study can 
help researchers understand and improve their 
forecasting methods.
The present paper studies how to optimally choose the 
weights used to combine several predictive densities. 
The method focuses on estimators of density 
combination weights based on the Probability Integral 
Transform or PIT (Rosenblatt, 1952; Diebold, Gunther, 
and Tay, 1998), which is defined as the researcher's 
predictive cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
evaluated at the actual realization of the time series. The 
PIT has a remarkably simple yet powerful property: it is 
uniformly distributed if and only if the predictive density 
used by the researcher coincides with the true predictive 
density conditional on the researcher's information set, 
which is the notion of optimality in this paper. 
Discrepancies between the true, unknown predictive 
distribution and the researcher's density forecast show 
up in the distribution of the PIT. This property can be 
used to design tests, but the present paper instead 
inverts the problem, proposing to estimate the optimal 
weights for combining densities by minimizing the 
distance between the uniform distribution and 
the empirical distribution of the combined PIT. 
The paper shows that this method leads to consistent 
weight estimators which have an optimality property. In 
an empirical application, I demonstrate that the novel 
PIT-based forecast combination method delivers one-
month-ahead forecasts of US industrial production 
growth which are superior to the widely used equal-
weights benchmark. The weight estimates show that 
housing permits were a useful predictor in the years 
preceding and following the Great Recession. 
Furthermore, financial variables, especially corporate 
bond spreads, received considerable weight during 
and after the recent financial crisis.
Econometric framework
Let yt denote the variable of interest to the forecaster. 
The available sample of size T+h is utilized as follows. 
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At forecasting time f, the researcher has M models 
available, which are indexed by m=1, …, M.1 These 
models are estimated in rolling windows of size R, where 
each estimation is based on information between t – R + 1 
and t. The time index t runs from t = f – G – h + 1 to t = f – h, 
where G is the total number of rolling windows 
(see Figure 1). At each t, each model implies an h-step-
ahead density forecast of yt+h. We use the notation 
 to represent the density of the variable yt+h, 
according to model m, based on the information set 
 that looks R periods back from time t. I propose to 
construct forecasts using a convex combination  of 
the M density models, as follows:
,
where the m superscript indexes the models. The 
weights are collected in a vector w≡(w1,…,wm)'. Requiring 
that the weights wm satisfy wm ≥ 0 for all m, and , 
guarantees that the density combination is itself also a 
density. The densities can also be converted into 
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) by integrating:
The estimation procedure is repeated in a similar way 
at all forecasting times f from G+h+R–1 to T. This 
scheme yields a total number of P=T–G–h–R out-of-
sample density forecasts with the corresponding 
realizations, which could be used to assess the 
performance of the forecast combinations. This rolling 
window scheme potentially alleviates problems related 
to structural instabilities. Furthermore, the paper 
shows that a consistent estimator is guaranteed by 
keeping the density estimation window size R relatively 
small, so that the number G of windows used to 
estimate the weights is relatively large.
Let  denote the true distribution of yt+h, 
conditional on information . If a set of weights w is 
found so that the combination  
coincides with the true distribution , then 
the combined forecast is said to be probabilistically 
calibrated. It is important to note that this notion 
of calibration does not require that the true predictive 
distribution belong to the set of M distributions. In 
practice, researchers typically do not know the true 
predictive density of yt+h, so the most they can aspire 
to is producing the best forecast conditional on 
the specific information set – that is, producing a 
probabilistically calibrated forecast.
The Probability Integral Transform (PIT) is defined as 
, which is the combined CDF 
evaluated at the realization of the variable yt+h. It can be 
shown that PITt+h follows the standard uniform distribution 
if and only if the forecast is probabilistically calibrated 
(see e.g. Corradi and Swanson, 2006). This key result 
forms the basis of the weight estimator proposed here.
Given this result, predictive performance can be assessed 
by observing how much the empirical distribution of the 
PIT deviates from uniformity.  Therefore, for any quantile 
r∈[0,1], let us define the function Ψ (r,w) ≡ Pr (PITt+h ≤ r)– r 
and its sample counterpart
where 1[∙] is the indicator function. The function ΨG 
measures the vertical distance between the empirical 
CDF of the PIT and the CDF of the uniform distribution 
(the 45 degree line) at quantile r, given the G 
observations used to evaluate the PITs up to and 
including the forecast origin f. Recall that over 
the full sample, the forecast origin f ranges from 
G+R+h–1 to T.
A particularly useful measure of discrepancy between 
distributions is the Anderson – Darling statistic2  
(Anderson and Darling, 1952), which is defined as
Intuitively, this statistic measures the squared vertical 
difference between the empirical CDF of the PIT and the 
uniform distribution, giving larger weight to deviations in 
the tails. Hence this paper proposes estimating the 
weights on a set of available density models to minimize 
the Anderson-Darling statistic:
1  “Model” is understood in a wide sense, and may include 
judgmental or survey forecasts as well.
PROPOSED ESTIMATION SCHEME FIGURE 1
2  The working paper also reports results based on the 
Kolmogorov – Smirnov and Cramer – von Mises statistics 
and the Kullback – Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC).
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untransformed, following McCracken and Ng (2016) 
and Carriero et al. (2015).4 All models were estimated 
using Maximum Likelihood in rolling windows of R=120 
months, with forecast origins f and target dates f+h 
ranging from February 1985 to January 2016 and March 
1985 to February 2016, respectively, resulting in a 
sequence of PITs for each model. The weights were 
themselves estimated in rolling windows of G=180 
monthly observations on the PITs, using the Anderson–
Darling objective function.
I compared the PIT-based estimator with (i) the KLIC-
based weight estimator (Hall and Mitchell, 2007), (ii) 
equal weights, (iii) the pure AR(2), (iv) a single model 
selected by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), 
and (v) Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). All of these 
benchmarks have been demonstrated to perform well 
in empirical exercises.5
To formally evaluate whether each density forecasting 
scheme delivers probabilistically calibrated forecasts, 
I test the uniformity of the PITs using the test developed 
by Rossi and Sekhposyan (2017). Under the null 
hypothesis of uniformity, their test allows for dynamic 
misspecification and maintains parameter estimation 
uncertainty, in line with this paper's framework, as the 
proposed optimal weighting scheme allows for both as 
well. Table 1 shows the results of the test of correct 
specification of each density combination method. As 
we can see, the Anderson-Darling weights, the BIC, 
and BMA deliver probabilistically calibrated forecasts 
of industrial production according to the Kolmogorov 
– Smirnov and the Cramer – von Mises-type test 
statistics, not rejecting the null even at the 10% level. 
Furthermore, the KLIC and the AR(2)-N also generate 
calibrated forecasts at the 5% level. It is reassuring 
that the proposed optimal weighting scheme is able to 
produce probabilistically calibrated forecasts in a 
setting where equal weighting surprisingly fails. 
Therefore we can conclude that the Anderson-Darling-
based estimator, and to a lesser extent, the KLIC-
based estimator are capable of delivering well-
calibrated density forecasts.
Furthermore, it is also interesting to see how the 
combination weights of the PIT-based estimator 
evolved over the out-of-sample period (March 1985 to 
February 2016), which is shown in Figure 2.
This estimator can be proved consistent, as G becomes 
large, under several technical conditions, including 
weak dependence,3 and continuity of the predictive 
distributions.
The working paper reports numerous Monte Carlo 
simulations demonstrating the favorable properties of 
the proposed estimator, featuring different data 
generating processes and sample sizes (G = 80, 200, 
500, 1000, 2000), to guide researchers in macroeconomics 
and finance.
Empirical application
The paper studies the empirical performance of the PIT-
based density combination method by comparing it 
against several alternative ways of combining density 
forecasts for US Industrial Production (IP). Based on 
their empirical success, as documented by Stock and 
Watson (2003), Granger and Jeon (2004), and Rossi 
and Sekhposyan (2014), I consider linear Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) models of the following form:
where y
τ
 is annualized US IP growth in month τ, that is 
y
τ
 ≡1200 Δ log IP
τ
, where Δ is the first difference operator, 
c is a constant term, βj and γj are coefficients on 
autoregressive terms and on additional explanatory 
variables, and σ scales the independently and identically 
normally distributed error term ϵ
τ+1. The lag length was 
specified following Granger and Jeon (2004), who 
demonstrated that two lags typically provide output 
forecasts with low root mean squared error.
All the data were obtained from the March 2016 vintage 
of the FRED-MD database (McCracken and Ng, 2016). 
The chosen output measure is the INDPRO series (ID: 3), 
which measures total industrial production. The 
possible elements of x
τ
 are the following variables 
(database identifiers in parentheses) - New Private Housing 
Permits SAAR (ID: 55); ISM: New Orders Index (ID: 61); 
S&P Common Stock Price Index: Composite (ID: 80); 
and Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield 
minus FEDFUNDS (ID: 100). I included these variables 
one at a time, obtaining four different specifications. 
Finally, I also estimated the pure AR(2) model, without 
additional regressors x
τ
. Hence, in total, the model set 
M contains five models. To obtain stationary series, I 
took the log difference of the S&P index and the log of 
the housing permits series, leaving other variables 
3  This assumption limits the temporal dependence of the time 
series, and rules out unit root processes, for example. It is 
required to invoke a law of large numbers.
5  Kascha and Ravazzolo (2010) and Rossi and Sekhposyan 
(2014) found that the equal weights combination scheme 
performs well when forecasting inflation with a large number 
of simple models. The AR(2) model with normal error terms, 
denoted by AR(2)-N, was shown to be a tough benchmark in 
point forecasting exercises, see for example Del Negro and 
Schorfheide (2013). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 RESEaRCh updaTE, SpRiNg 2018
knowledge, the present paper is the first to show in 
an out-of-sample forecasting exercise that during 
and after the Great Recession, density forecasts of 
models that feature a spread variable also perform 
better in predicting industrial production. Interestingly, 
since around 2009, housing permits have again 
emerged as a powerful predictor.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed consistent estimators of 
weights that can be used to combine several density 
models to approximate the true predictive density for 
an economic time series. Most of the existing literature 
discusses testing whether density forecasts are 
correctly calibrated, but estimating the combination 
weights has received considerably less attention, 
which is the topic of the present paper. Monte Carlo 
experiments confirm that the proposed asymptotic 
theory performs well for sample sizes which are 
relevant in macroeconometrics and finance. The 
empirical exercise reported here demonstrates that 
this paper's methodology improves on individual 
models' density forecasts of US industrial production 
and delivers probabilistically calibrated forecast 
densities. The estimated weights highlight the 
importance of non-Gaussian predictive densities, and 
they are also intuitively interpretable, demonstrating 
that the housing market was one of the drivers of 
output growth before and after the recent financial 
crisis. Moreover, corporate bond yield spreads have 
considerable predictive content, especially during the 
Great Recession. 
The present paper offers several avenues for further 
research. The empirical exercise suggests that weight 
estimates display persistence, so incorporating the 
information contained in past weights might improve 
the estimators. Another possibility is the inclusion of a 
penalty term to shrink the weights towards zero, 
focusing on the most relevant models. Practitioners in 
finance and risk management could also take advantage 
of the estimators proposed here to construct more 
precise Value at Risk estimates using combinations of 
density forecasts, and focusing on a specific part of the 
predictive distribution.
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thE impact oF high school Financial Education  
on knoWlEdgE and choicEs: EVidEncE  
From a randomizEd trial
SUMMARY OF BANCO DE ESPAÑA WORKING PAPER Nº 1801
OLYMPIA BOVER, LAURA HOSPIDO AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA 
introduction
Surveys conducted in several countries around the 
world confirm that many individuals are not familiar with 
basic notions about inflation, interest rate compounding 
and diversification. Furthermore, several studies have 
documented that households with higher financial 
knowledge tend to have higher net wealth levels and 
lower indebtedness. These findings have given rise to a 
number of initiatives aimed at increasing the financial 
knowledge of the population.1 However, a correlation 
between financial knowledge and financial outcomes 
may not be informative about the effectiveness of 
financial education in avoiding some bad outcomes 
such as excess indebtedness. The reason is that a 
correlation between financial knowledge and higher 
levels of net wealth may merely reflect the fact that 
individuals with high wealth levels also have a higher 
incentive to devote time to acquiring financial skills.  
To understand the implications of providing financial 
education in high school, this article summarizes the 
results of an intervention in the academic year 2014-
2015 that delivered 10 hours of instruction on personal 
finance to some 3,000 students aged 14-15 years in 77 
high schools all over Spain. In 12 out of the 17 
Autonomous Communities, teachers from each high 
school involved in the study delivered lessons on banking 
products, means of payments, elaborating a budget or 
responsible consumption. Relative to previous 
interventions, this study makes three main contributions.2 
Firstly, personal finance programs differ in the target 
population group. We focus on the knowledge acquired 
and on the behaviour of adolescents, a group of the 
population at the verge of making important lifetime 
decisions, like leaving school after completing 
compulsory education. Secondly, financial education 
programs also differ in their contents –some emphasizing 
the elaboration of budgets, others emphasizing saving 
vehicles. By combining surveys of teachers and the 
results of standardized financial knowledge tests, we 
examine which specific contents students lack and in 
which ones they improve. Finally, the impact of financial 
education programs on knowledge and choices may 
vary across students according to their opportunities to 
acquire that knowledge in the family or elsewhere. The 
design of the experiment allows us to estimate different 
impacts for public and non-public schools, strong 
correlates of parental background.
Contents of the course
The intervention we analyze gives teachers access to 
ten lessons of Web-based material. The material can 
be grouped into four main areas:
—  Saving towards a goal: This topic addresses  
how saving increases future consumption 
possibilities and, in addition, introduces the 
notion of interest rates.
—  A second set of modules includes examples of 
how to elaborate a budget to be able to save 
and meet future needs. For example, students 
learn about the allocation of regular and irregular 
expenses in a monthly budget.
—  A third set of modules deals with responsible 
consumption, aimed at characterizing cons-
picuous or environmentally unfriendly expenditure.
—  A fourth set of modules introduces the different 
types of bank accounts and credit cards. 
Students are introduced to the concepts of 
commissions and fees, as well as the trade-off 
between liquidity and return. This part also 
covers basic security rules in checking and 
saving accounts.
There are two final modules on specific investment 
vehicles, such as pension funds and insurance 
vehicles. However, survey evidence suggests that very 
few teachers had enough time to deliver that material.
1  Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) and OECD (2017) review 
international evidence on financial literacy. Bernheim et al. 
(2001) provided evidence about the link between financial 
education and outcomes in adulthood. There have been 
several reassessments of that evidence, see for example 
Brown et al. (2016).
2  See, for example, Bruhn et al. (2013), Alan and Ertac (2017) 
and Lührmann et al. (2017).
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tested and surveyed, but not taught the material. 46% 
of all high schools contacted fully accepted the 
conditions. The final sample of 9th graders we use 
contains 3,055 students in the baseline measurement. 
Most of the analysis uses a balanced sample of 2,734 
9th graders.
Given the evaluation calendar, we can test various 
hypotheses. 
—  Firstly, did the course increase financial 
knowledge and change attitudes and choices 
immediately after the course? We do this by 
comparing 9th graders in treated and control 
schools in March 2015. 
—  Regarding longer-run outcomes – a three-
month period after the course was delivered 
– we can test two hypotheses. Firstly, we can 
test if financial knowledge is forgotten by 
comparing the results in June 2015 test of 
9th graders in early and late treated schools. 
Secondly, we examine the impact of financial 
literacy courses on the preferences for 
current versus future income in an incentivized 
saving task conducted in June 2015. This is 
done by comparing choices of 9th and 10th 
graders – as the latter have not gone through 
the course.
We test all hypotheses by means of OLS regressions, 
controlling for the corresponding outcome observed in 
the baseline measurement in 2014. When the outcome 
of interest is the score in standardized tests of financial 
knowledge, we hold constant the score in the baseline 
test, and when the outcome is preferences for earlier 
payments, we hold constant preferences for current 
income elicited through hypothetical survey questions 
in December 2014.
Methodology
The population of interest are 9th grade students in 
high schools applying to participate in the program for 
the first time during the 2014-2015 academic year. 
Ninth grade is called 3º ESO in the Spanish educational 
system and, assuming normal academic progress, it is 
meant to be directed to 14-15 year-olds. Tenth grade 
(4º ESO) is the last year of compulsory education.
We used a phased-in design, randomized across 
schools, within the 2014-2015 academic year. We 
randomized the quarter when the material was 
delivered, the options being either January-March 
2015 (the treated schools) or April-June 2015 (the 
control schools). Given the heterogeneity in applicants, 
randomization was done within strata defined by the 
type of school (public, private or chatered), whether 
the school was in Madrid or not, and the date of 
application to the program. 
Table 1 shows the design of the evaluation. In 
December 2014 students took a baseline test as well 
as a short survey on demographics. In March 2015 
students took a second financial literacy (FL) test and 
an additional survey. At the time of the March 2015 
measurement, neither 9th graders in the control 
schools nor any 10th graders had received any material 
on financial literacy, thus providing a natural control 
group. Finally, in June 2015, 9th graders took a third 
financial literacy test as well as an incentivized task 
where students could choose between receiving actual 
payments in two moments in time at different interest 
rates. Due to budgetary considerations, the only 10th 
graders who did the incentivized saving task were 
those in Madrid.
Participation was conditional on schools’ acceptance 
of the following conditions. The course should be 
delivered to 9th graders in the assigned quarter. In 
addition, a group in 10th grade (4 ESO) had to be 
NOTES: (*) November 2014: All teachers invited to Banco de España for a session on the purpose of the evaluation, timetable of the course and going over one 
of the lessons. (**) 10th grade incentivized saving task conducted in Madrid schools only.
EVALUATION CALENDAR (*) 
June 2015
9th graders (15 years of age)
    1  Treated schools esruoc oNesruoc LF
    2  Control schools esruoc LFesruoc oN
10th graders (16 years of age)
    1  Treated schools esruoc oNesruoc oN
    2  Control schools esruoc oNesruoc oN
Third test and 
incentivized saving task
Baseline survey 
and pre-test
Post-test, survey 
to students
Incentivized
saving task**
December 2014 March 2015
Baseline survey 
and pre-test
Post-test, survey 
to students
EVALUATION CALENDAR (*) TABLE 1
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occupations (say, a lawyer) and with a mid-skill 
occupation (say, an accountant) were 30% of one 
standard deviation. The impact of the course on financial 
knowledge is half as large as that difference. Finally, as of 
June 2015, there were no noticeable differences between 
two groups, once the second group had also received 
the material. That finding is consistent with the notion 
that the material is not forgotten quickly.
Turning to the specific knowledge acquired through the 
course, we find that the program mostly affected 
knowledge of banking relationships – i.e, bank accounts, 
interest rate compounding and bank fees. The 
improvement in budgeting ability (for example, allocating 
expenses and incomes into fixed or variable) was very 
limited, possibly because knowledge on the topic was 
already high at baseline. In contrast, banking 
relationships (bank accounts, interest rate compounding, 
bank fees) were the topic were students performed 
worst on in the baseline. 
Results
4.1 Financial knowledge
Figure 1 summarizes the impact of the course on the 
score on a financial literacy test. The score is the 
fraction of correct answers in a test containing 30 
items developed and tested by educational experts. 
As shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 1, baseline 
differences across treated and control schools were 
negligible in December 2014. By March 2015 9th 
graders in treated schools increased their 
performance in the financial knowledge test by 15 
percent of one standard deviation. It is convenient 
to compare the magnitude of the estimate with the 
impact of parental background on financial 
knowledge, measured by the 2012 financial 
PISA assessment. In Spain, the differences in 
performance in the financial PISA assessment 
between students whose parents had skilled 
The Panel on the left side shows the difference in normalized scores in financial knowledge tests between treated and control 9th graders in December 2014 
(baseline) and in March 2015 (after students treated in January-March 2015 had received the course). The Panel on the right side splits the gain in financial 
knowledge in the March 2015 test by topic. The sample size is 2734 students from 77 high schools.
THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL LITERACY (FL) COURSES ON SCORES IN STANDARDIZED TESTS
1  DIFFERENCES IN FINANCIAL LITERACY TEST
    Standardized scores, 3º ESO
FIGURE 1
2  DIFFERENCES IN FINANCIAL LITERACY TEST BY TOPIC
    Standardized scores, 3º ESO
Treated students are 9th graders in Madrid receiving the course between January and March 2015. Controls are all 10th graders in Madrid. Estimates are means, 
unadjusted by covariates or strata. Choices inconsistent with the law of demand are included.
EUROS ALLOCATED TO EARLIER PAYMENT BY TREATED AND CONTROL GROUPS 
IN INCENTIVIZED SAVING TASK. June 2015
1  TODAY VS. ONE WEEK 2  TODAY VS. TWO WEEKS 3  ONE WEEK VS. TWO WEEKS
FIGURE 2
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certain financial matters may only pay off for students 
who have a minimum level of wealth. In that case, the 
intervention would primarily benefit better-off students.
The design of the evaluation permits us to identify 
differential impacts by parental background. School 
type is a strong predictor of parental background, as 
students in public schools are more likely to have 
repeated a grade than students in non-public ones 
(28% vs 16%), and expect to abandon their studies 
earlier (71% vs 82% expect to finish college). The fact 
that randomization was conducted within groups of 
schools (public or non-public) guarantees that, within 
those strata, students have comparable observed and 
unobserved characteristics.
We focus here on two main outcomes of those shown 
in Table 2. The first is financial knowledge, measured 
right after the course was taken. The average impact 
on knowledge is remarkably similar across both sets of 
schools, and amounts to 17 percent of one standard 
deviation. However, the distribution of the effect is very 
different across schools. In public schools, receiving 
financial literacy material diminishes the fraction of 
students who perform poorly. Namely, the fraction 
of treated students who get less than 25% of the 
questions right falls by 4 percentage points. Conversely, 
in non-public schools the fraction of low achievers 
does not change. The working paper summarized here 
argues that this impact may be associated to grade 
repeaters.
Turning to attitudes, students in public schools treated 
between January and March allocated 37 cents less to 
the earlier payment than controls, while the 
corresponding difference among students in non-
public schools is 6 cents. While we cannot reject the 
null of equal coefficients, the results suggest that when 
we measure preferences for time using an incentivized 
saving task, exposure to financial education changed 
financial decision-making of students in strata with a 
relatively poorer background.
discussion
Recent studies have documented that introducing 
financial education in high school is effective in 
increasing financial knowledge, although little is known 
about whether all sorts of students benefit from that 
training and what contents reach students better. Our 
results show that financial education increases 
standardized test scores by 15% of one standard 
deviation. In terms of knowledge, students learnt most 
about the functioning of savings and borrowing 
products – i.e., about the opportunity cost of 
4.2.  Behavior in incentivized saving tasks  
(Convex Time Budget Task) 
Students may forget financial knowledge if it is not put 
into practice. However, the course may have a lasting 
impact to the extent that the intervention also changes 
students’ attitudes. We tested formally for changes in 
attitudes by having students allocate 6 euros between 
two different moments in time at varying interest rates 
– a Convex Time Budget Task.3 Each student was 
asked to make three different choices. The first 
decision allocated resources between the day of the 
test or one week later. The second allocated between 
the day of the test and two weeks later, and the third 
between one and two weeks from the day of the test. 
Students could allocate to the earlier payment either 
all the resources (6 euros), 2/3 of the resources (4 
euros), 1/3 (2 euros) or nothing at all. For each decision, 
and depending on the specific treatment, the amount 
not allocated to the earlier payment accumulated at 
two interest rates: 100% and 200%.
Payments were made in terms of USBs with different 
storage capacities, roughly corresponding to market 
values. One student randomly chosen in each class 
would receive one of his/her own choices.
The results in Figure 2 show that students having gone 
over the course between January and March 2015 
allocated less euros to the earlier payment at each 
possible maturity. For example, when given the 
possibility to allocate 6 euros between the present day 
or one week later at a 100% interest rate, 9th graders 
going through the course in January-March 2015 
allocated 70 cents to the day of the test (out of the 6 euros) 
while controls allocated thirty cents more (the standard 
error is 17 cents). Not surprisingly, the reduction in 
present payments is more salient for the 100% interest 
rate choice than for the 200% one. Interestingly, that 
result is consistent with answers in hypothetical 
choices between current and future income stated in 
the March 2015 survey.
Results by type of school
The impact of financial education is likely to be 
heterogeneous across different groups of the 
population. Firstly, as financial literacy correlates with 
parental income and education, students of better-off 
parents may be more likely to acquire that financial 
knowledge at home. Therefore, one could expect that 
financial courses in school would be most effective for 
disadvantaged students. On the other hand, interest in 
3  See Andreoni and Sprenger (2012).
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elaborate a budget or how to avoid conspicuous 
consumption.
Secondly, comparing results across school types we 
find that the average impact of financial literacy on 
financial knowledge is similar in public and non-
public schools, while in public schools only we find 
decreased inequality in financial literacy scores after 
the course. Separate analyses suggest that impacts 
on financial test scores are largest among grade 
transferring resources over time. When given the 
option to transfer resources between two moments in 
time at a given interest rate, students exposed to 
financial education assigned lower amounts to earlier 
payments than those that did not. Both findings are 
consistent with the notion that financial education 
changes the awareness of students about the future 
consequences of current choices. However, our 
results do not indicate that financial literacy courses 
change students’ behavior by teaching them how to 
NOTES: In panel B, each cell shows the estimate and standard error (S.E) of the variable “Treated” in a regression where the dependent variable is shown in the 
row and covariates include the lagged dependent variable and strata dummies. All coefficients estimated by OLS but the one in row 6, wich is the latent coefficient 
of an ordered Probit, and standard errors are clustered at the school level. *** p-value <0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1.
Public Non-Public
Panel A: Sample characteristics, by stratum
0.14 0.07    Foreign born
0.28 0.16    Older than normal progression
0.24 0.32    Father is self-employed 
0.57 0.55    Father works as an employee
0.14 0.09    Father does not work
0.05 0.02    Expects to leave at 16
0.12 0.07    Expects to finish at most HS academic track
0.11 0.08    Expects to finish at most HS vocational training
0.71 0.82    Expects to finish college
1,646 (42) 671 (24)    Number of students (schools)
    B.1  Score in financial knowledge tests
H0: Equal coefficients
[p-value]
071.erocs tset dezidradnatS  1        .173  
(.096)* (.075)** [.971]
040.-tcerroc snoitseuq %52 naht ssel htiw noitcarF  2        .003  
(.018)** .(009) [.043]
850.-tcerroc snoitseuq %53 naht ssel htiw noitcarF  3        .020  
(.030)** (.027) [.059]
250.-tcerroc snoitseuq %05 naht ssel htiw noitcarF  4        -.070  
    B.2  Attitudes
970.stnerap ot sklaT  5        .152
(.077) (.072)** [.356]
120.emocni lacitehtopyh deyaled sreferP  6        .038
(.016) (.016)** [.441]
    B.2  Sources of income
620.ssenisub ylimaf/emoh ta serohc rof yenoM  7        .086
(.031) (.032)** [.069]
        8  Money for occasional jobs outside home -.009 .037
)610.(emocni fo ecruos rehtO  9        (.027) [.505]
73.-)dirdaM( ksat gnivas dezivitnecnI  5.B    -.065  
*)02.(etad reilrae eht ot detacolla soruE  01        (.14) [.271]
Panel B: Impacts of financial education on knowledge and attitudes, by stratum
THE EFFECT OF THE FINANCIAL LITERACY PROGRAM ON ATTITUDES BY STRATA TABLE 2
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repeaters or among students who expect to drop out 
earlier. When it comes to incentivized saving tasks, the 
impact of financial literacy on measures of patience is 
higher in public- than in non-public schools, although 
the difference is not statistically significant. At any 
rate, we find that exposure to financial literacy 
increases incentivized measures of patience in public 
schools.
The time span of the intervention does not allow us to 
answer the question posed at the beginning of this 
summary: “Does financial education delivered in high 
school help in achieving better financial outcomes in 
adulthood?” We note however that we find changes in 
attitudes –in particular, patience- within a group that is 
at the verge of taking important lifetime decisions. Our 
current efforts are directed to following participant 
students and addressing whether financial education 
changes outcomes later in life.
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introduction
The recent financial crisis has sparked a debate about the 
influence of monetary policy on the risk-taking behavior 
of the banking sector. A number of recent studies such 
as Jimenez et al. (2014), Buch et al. (2014) and 
Ioannidou et al. (2014) show that low interest rates 
increase the risk appetite of banks, creating an 
additional channel of monetary policy transmission, 
known as the risk-taking channel. Though there has 
been much discussion of this channel amongst policy 
makers in recent years, its general equilibrium and 
optimal monetary policy implications remain unclear. 
Answering these questions requires a quantitative 
model that is consistent with both the evidence on the 
risk-taking channel and with conventional views about 
monetary policy. Our contribution is to build and 
estimate a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model 
where monetary policy influences bank risk taking, 
which in turn affects the real economy.1 Furthermore, 
we provide analytical results which show how the 
inefficiency of risk taking depends on the volatility of 
the real interest rate, implying a motive for the policy 
maker to stabilize the real interest rate, at the cost of 
greater inflation volatility. This constitutes a new trade-
off that influences optimal monetary policy in a 
quantitatively significant way. 
Model
We propose a New Keynesian general-equilibrium 
model with banks. The real economy follows the well-
known workhorse model of Smets and Wouters (2007). 
For brevity it suffices to say that it features both wage 
and price rigidities as well as consumption habits and 
investment adjustment costs. The novel building block 
is the banking sector, which builds on Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2014) and which we represent here in a simplified way. 
Each period t, a continuum of banks raise funds from 
the household through deposit and equity contracts; 
then they use these funds to invest in risky capital 
projects. These projects turn into capital next period, 
which is then rented to the firms. Hence, banks face a 
two-stage problem, which can conveniently be solved 
backwards, starting with the second-stage investment 
choice. At this stage banks have already raised equity 
and deposits and now choose from a continuum of 
investment projects with different risk-return 
characteristics. Each bank can invest in only one 
project. Each project has its own success probability, qt.
If successful, it yields  units of capital in the 
next period; otherwise it fails and yields nothing. Thus, 
the expected return on one unit of investment is 
. This implies the return to a 
project in the event of success increases in its riskiness, 
but the expected return is concave function, as shown 
by the solid line in Figure 1. The bank chooses the risk 
level of its investment in order to maximize the expected 
return of the investment minus the cost of deposits.
Two distinct frictions are relevant at this stage. First, 
we assume that depositors cannot observe the bank’s 
risk choice, and hence cannot condition the deposit 
rate on it. Second, bank equity holders, who manage 
the bank, are protected by limited liability. Hence, 
they default on the deposit liabilities in case the 
investment fails. Now, denote the deposit rate by rd,t, 
the equity ratio by kt, and the expected value of one 
unit of capital tomorrow2 by rl,t. Suppressing aggregate 
uncertainty and the stochastic discount factor in 
order to simplify the exposition,3 the bank’s second 
stage problem is
 
                                  (1)
Figure 1 represents this problem graphically. While the 
solid line traces out the expected return of the 
investment, the dashed line depicts the bank’s objective 
function, i.e. the expected return to the leveraged 
bank’s investment under limited liability and 
unobservability of the risk choice.
As the figure shows, these two frictions together 
constitute an agency problem, which leads to an 
incentive for risk shifting: the bank chooses a level of 
1  Risk taking on the liabilities side of banks in the context of 
DSGE models is analyzed in papers such as Angeloni and 
Faia (2013), Angeloni et al. (2015). Asset risk taking is 
typically analyzed from a primarily regulatory perspective 
such as in Christensen et al. (2011) and Collard et al. (2012).
2  rl,t is given by sum of the expected rental rate obtained when 
renting capital to the firms plus the resale value of the 
depreciated stock of capital.
3  See Working Paper 1805 for the complete exposition.
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                (2)
subject to the above supply schedules.
Furthermore, we shall assume that banks can enter the 
market each period freely, such that the excess return 
on equity, i.e. the return net of opportunity costs given 
by (2), has to be zero in equilibrium. Given these 
assumptions, and assuming interior solutions, the 
banks’ equilibrium choices for their equity ratio 
and the riskiness of their investments are 
                                                                 
(3)
                                                            (4)
These solutions have three noteworthy features. First, as 
mentioned before and shown in Figure 1, banks’ risk 
choices are excessive: they choose a success probability 
 lower than the probability  that maximizes 
the expected return. Second, notice that these choices 
depend on Rt, the expected safe real rate of the 
economy. In particular, both the equity ratio  and 
the success probability  increase with Rt. That is, 
lower interest rates are associated with higher risk 
taking, just as the empirical literature suggests. Why? A 
lower risk-free rate increases the relative cost advantage 
of deposits, since the equity premium becomes more 
important in relative terms. Banks respond by levering 
up and choose riskier investment projects. Third, notice 
that the efficiency of the bank’s investment choice, 
measured by the expected return  of its investment, 
is an increasing and concave function of the interest 
rate Rt . That is, lower interest rates lead to higher risk 
taking, which in turn implies a lower expected return of 
investment. Furthermore, concavity implies that this 
effect is stronger, the lower the interest rate, as seen in 
Figure 1.
In the paper we extend this simple model to allow for a 
recovery rate for failed investment projects, partial 
deposit insurance, and a generic relationship between 
the safeness qt of an investment and its expected return 
qt(Rt), and show that the above results still go through.
implications for monetary policy
Introducing the risk-taking channel into a macro model 
has two implications for monetary policy. 
First, lower real interest rates, by increasing the risk 
choice of banks, ceteris paribus, i.e. holding constant 
investment, lead to a decline in the capital stock in 
risk that is higher than the one which maximizes the 
expected return f (qt). This is because, on the one hand, 
limited liability implies that the bank benefits fully from 
the upside risk of the investment but suffers only 
partially from its downside risk. On the other hand, due 
to unobservability, depositors can’t discipline the bank’s 
incentives by conditioning the deposit rate on risk.
At stage 1 banks raise their funds. They choose both 
deposits and equity, but in equilibrium they will be 
indifferent about their size, so it suffices to analyze 
the banks’ choice in terms of the equity ratio kt 
(equity over deposits). Households supply deposits 
and equity according to the following supply 
schedules (again, suppressing the stochastic 
discount factor):
.
Here qt denotes the solution to the second stage 
problem, Rt is the gross nominal return on safe 
government bonds divided by expected inflation, and ξ 
is an exogenous equity premium. rd,t denotes the ex ante 
fixed gross nominal deposit rate divided by expected 
inflation, and re,t the expected uncertain real return on 
equity. Two details are important: first, equity is 
assumed to be ξ units more expensive than deposits. 
One interpretation of this excess equity premium ξ is a 
management cost.4 Second, both depositors and 
equity providers anticipate the risk choice in stage 2 
correctly. The bank’s equity provider, who manages the 
bank, chooses the equity ratio so as to maximize his 
profits net of his opportunity cost:
4  Notice that ξ is an excess premium. It makes equity more 
expensive over and above the compensation for aggregate risk. 
(Recall that aggregate risk is suppressed in the notation here.)
NOTES: The solid line is the expected return of the investment as a function of 
the level of safety q chosen. The dashed curve describes the return on equity, 
which is maximized at the second stage for given rd, rl and k. Its maximum is 
marked by the black dot. A reduction in the real rate R implies higher leverage 
(a lower equity ratio k), shifting the dashed curve down and left, which leads to 
a lower choice of q (gray dot).
THE BANK’S RISK CHOICE FIGURE 1
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a new trade-off between the conventional objective of 
inflation stabilization and the new objective of interest 
rate stabilization. Still, one may also wonder whether 
this finding is of any quantitative significance. Is this 
new channel strong, affecting optimal monetary policy 
in a quantitatively significant manner? After all, previous 
studies have found that inflation stabilization is a rather 
robust policy objective.
Our estimated model allows us to answer this 
quantitative question. To do so, we determine optimal 
simple monetary policy rules both in our model of the 
risk-taking channel and in the benchmark Smets and 
Wouters (2007) model.6 That is, we consider a Taylor-
type interest rate setting rule and optimize its 
parameters for each of the two models. For example, 
consider the rule
                                                             (5)
This is a standard Taylor rule, in which the central bank 
sets its nominal interest rate in response to deviations 
of inflation  and output  from steady state (deviations 
are denoted by the hat). For comparability, the 
parameters we use are the same in both models and 
are those which we estimated for our model with the 
risk-taking channel.7 The table shows the resulting 
policy parameters. We observe that in the presence of 
the risk-taking channel the central bank responds 
much less strongly to inflation (the inflation coefficient 
is cut by more than half), its primary concern in the 
model without risk taking.
Next, we compare the performance of the two rules in 
the model with risk taking. We shall refer to them as 
rules S (optimal in the Smets and Wouters model) and 
O (optimal with risk taking). This comparison has an 
interesting interpretation. Suppose that the actual 
economy features the risk-taking channel, but the 
general equilibrium. Hence, our model generates a new 
transmission channel through which monetary policy 
affects the real economy, which offsets 
the positive effects of expansionary monetary policy, 
as reductions in the interest rate exacerbate the 
financial market distortions and their implied 
inefficiency. We validate the quantitative implications 
of the model by estimating it on US data with Bayesian 
methods. We use the same 7 time series5 as Smets 
and Wouters (2007) and focus on the Great Moderation 
period, 1984Q1 to 2007Q3. Posterior odds show that 
the inclusion of the risk-taking channel improves the 
in-sample fit for non-financial variables. At the same time 
our model predicts a path of risk taking that matches 
survey evidence on the riskiness of newly issued loans 
from the Fed Survey of Terms of Business Lending.
But more importantly, the risk-taking channel has 
normative implications. Since the efficiency of 
investment is linked to the real rate through banks’ risk 
choice, monetary policy affects allocative efficiency in 
this economy not only through the conventional 
channels related to price rigidities, but also through the 
risk-taking channel. In particular, higher rates imply 
higher efficiency of the banks’ risk choice. Hence, the 
policy maker may want to raise the average level of real 
interest rates. However, under long-run neutrality of 
monetary policy this is not possible; monetary policy 
can only affect real interest rates in the short run.
But that does not mean that the risk-taking channel is 
irrelevant for the policy maker. As we just argued, the 
expected return on investment  is a concave 
function of the real rate. That means that even if 
monetary policy can not affect the average level of Rt, it 
can affect the average level of  through the 
volatility of Rt. In particular, the more stable the real 
rate, the higher the expected return of investment. 
Mathematically, this is a result of Jensen’s inequality. 
Intuitively, this is because movements of the rate 
downwards have a negative effect on the expected 
return that is stronger than the positive effect of upward 
movements of the same size.
Hence, the risk-taking channel generates a motive to 
stabilize the real interest rate, because this ameliorates 
the average inefficiency in the financial sector. This 
however requires more muted responses of the interest 
rate to inflation deviations. Thus, stabilizing the real 
rate comes at the expense of greater inflation volatility, 
which, is undesirable in a framework with nominal 
rigidities. Therefore, the risk-taking channel generates 
5  Hours worked, inflation, the fed funds rate, and the growth 
rates of real hourly wage, real GDP per capita, real 
consumption per capita and investment per capita.
6  Note that our model collapses to this benchmark model if any 
of the three frictions (incomplete contracts, limited liability, 
equity premium) is removed.
7  In the paper we show that our results are robust to 
estimating each model separately. We also consider a wider 
set of policy rules.
TABLE 1OPTIMAL SIMPLE RULES 
φπ πφ y φ φ y
7.1 0.12 3.08 0.13 0.48
Smets and Wouters
(2007) model (S)
Model with 
risk taking (O)
Welfare
difference
in % of cons. 
equ.
NOTES: The first four columns show the optimal Taylor rule coefficients. The 
last column reports the difference in welfare between the two rules in the model 
with risk taking.
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these frictions, real interest rate stabilization arises as 
a new objective for monetary policy. Estimating 
the model for US data, we conclude that this channel 
indeed affects the optimal conduct of monetary policy 
in a significant way.
REfERENCES
ANGELONI I., and E. FAIA (2013). Capital regulation 
and monetary policy with fragile banks. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 60(3): 311–324, April.
ANGELONI I., E. FAIA and M. LO DUCA (2015). 
Monetary policy and risk taking, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 52: 285–307, March.
BUCH C., S. EICKMEIER and E. PRIETO (2014). In 
search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank 
risk taking. Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, 43(C): 12-30.
CHRISTENSEN I., C. MEH and K. MORAN (2011). 
Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic 
Dynamics. Working Papers 11-32, Bank of Canada.
COLLARD F., H. DELLAS, B. DIBA and O. LOISEL 
(2012). Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies. 
Working paper.
SMETS F., and R. WOUTERS (2007). Shocks and Frictions 
in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach. 
American Economic Review, 97(3): 586-606. 
IOANNIDOU V., S. ONGENA and J. L. PEYDRO (2015). 
Monetary Policy, Risk- Taking and Pricing: Evidence 
from a Quasi-Natural Experiment. Review of 
Finance, 19(1): 95-144.
DELL’ARICCIA G., L. LAEVEN and R. MARQUEz 
(2014). Real interest rates, leverage, and bank risk-
taking. Journal of Economic Theory, 149(C): 65-99.
JIMENEz G., S. ONGENA, J. L. PEYDRO and J. 
SAURINA (2014). Hazardous Times for Monetary 
Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans 
Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit 
Risk-Taking? Econometrica, 82(2): 463-505.
central bank is unaware of this channel and believes 
that risk cannot be influenced by the interest rate. The 
central bank would then implement rule S, i.e. optimal 
policy based on a wrong model. Our comparison then 
answers the question of how important it is to 
understand the risk-taking channel.
We find that applying the truly optimal rule O instead of 
rule S leads to a marked decline in the volatility of the 
real interest rate (–48%) and the banks’ risk choice qt 
(–42%) and an equally important increase of inflation 
volatility (+52%).8 While the direction of this change 
was foreseeable based on the previous discussion, the 
magnitude of the effect appears significant. This strong 
reduction in the second moment of the real rate has a 
sizable effect on the first moment (the average) of the 
expected return on investment, which increases by 
about 0.5%. This higher investment efficiency in turn 
increases welfare. Indeed, we find that expected 
welfare (expressed in terms of lifetime consumption 
equivalent) is roughly 0.5% higher if the central bank 
applies rule O instead of rule S. Thus, the risk-taking 
channel appears quantitatively important.
In the paper we also show that a policy rule with 
persistence can do even better and that in our model 
there is no strong reason for the central bank to respond 
to leverage. This is because leverage itself is a function 
of the interest rate, so including leverage explicitly in 
the policy rule is not necessary.
Conclusion
Summing up, the paper discussed here integrates a 
micro-founded model of the bank risk-taking channel 
into an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework. 
This channel is driven by three frictions in the financial 
sector: unobservability of risk taking, limited liability, 
and a cost advantage of deposits over equity. Due to 
8  These numbers are reported under the ergodic distribution, 
calculated using a second order approximation of the model.
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The Spanish economy witnessed an unprecedented 
boom-bust cycle over the 2002-2013 period, both in 
terms of real activity and credit. Indeed, the high 
correlation between the growth rate of credit to non-
financial corporations and GDP points to strong 
feedback effects between both variables, as evidenced 
in Figure 1. The investigation of the link between credit 
shocks and real variables, however, poses several 
challenges. In terms of identification, one needs to 
disentangle the bank lending-channel (banks’ ability or 
willingness to lend) from the firm borrowing-channel 
(firms' ability or willingness to borrow). Even after 
identifying the two channels separately, the intricate 
real consequences may depend on a firm's position in 
the value chain, involving direct and indirect effects 
via buyer-supplier (input-output) relations. So far, little 
empirical work has analyzed this channel. In this paper, 
we take crucial steps to address these challenges.
We combine administrative data for all firms in Spain 
with a matched bank-firm-loan dataset that incorporates 
information on the universe of corporate loans for 2003-
2013 (Spanish Credit Registry, CIR). Using methods 
from the matched employer-employee literature for 
handling large data sets, we identify and estimate bank- 
and firm-specific shocks for each year in our sample. 
Using the Spanish input-output structure to construct 
firm-specific measures of upstream and downstream 
exposure, we estimate the direct and indirect effects of 
firm-specific exogenous credit supply shocks on real 
activity. 
According to our estimates, both the direct and 
indirect propagation effects on real variables are 
sizable. We calculate that a one standard deviation 
increase in firms’ credit supply generates increases of 
0.28 pp., 0.10 pp., and 0.79 pp. in the annual growth of 
employment, output, and investment, respectively. 
Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in our 
measure of how much firms buy inputs from industries in 
which credit supply expands (downstream effects) 
generates increases of 0.30 pp., 0.35 pp., and 0.69 pp. in 
the growth rates of employment, output, and investment. 
Interestingly, the direct and indirect effects of bank 
credit supply shocks vary over time, being much 
stronger during the 2008-2009 credit collapse, when 
firms faced more difficulties in undoing bank-specific 
credit shocks. We find no significant effects of credit 
supply shocks on employment before the financial 
crisis, while investment displays similar reactions 
throughout the entire period. 
disentangling credit supply and demand
Consider a firm that has credit exposure with two 
different banks in year t–1. If this firm’s credit grows 
more between t–1 and t with the first bank, we assume 
that the credit supply of the first bank has grown 
more than that of the second bank. The justification for 
this assumption is that demand factors are held 
constant by comparing the same firm in the same year 
with two different banks, so differences between the 
two credit growth rates can be attributed to the (bank) 
supply side. More formally, we consider the following 
regression:
                                                         (1)
where ∆lncijt refers to the yearly average of outstanding 
credit of firm j with bank i in year t. δit and λjt can be 
interpreted as time-varying supply and demand shocks, 
respectively. To be more concrete, δit captures bank-
specific effects identified through differences in credit 
growth between banks lending to the same firm.1 This 
identification strategy resembles that of the bank 
lending channel by Khwaja and Mian (2008) but instead 
of considering observed bank supply shocks (e.g., 
liquidity shocks), we consider unobserved shocks 
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1  Note that this identification scheme implies reliance on 
multi-bank firms, which represent approximately 75% of the 
bank-firm-year relationships in our sample.
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further evidence in favor of the validity of our identified 
bank supply shocks.
direct real effects of credit shocks over the cycle
To estimate the effects of the bank lending channel on 
real outcomes, we match the credit registry information 
with annual, firm-level administrative data on different 
firm characteristics. We consider the effects of credit 
supply on firms' annual employment and output growth 
as well as investment as follows:
                                                            (2)
where Yjt refers to employment growth (in terms of log-
differences of number of employees), output growth 
(in terms of log-differences of euros), or investment 
(capital stock in t minus capital stock in t–1 as a share 
of total capital stock in t) of firm j in year t.  represents 
a firm-specific credit supply shock constructed as a 
weighted average of the supply shocks estimated for 
all banks in a relationship with firm j, with weights given 
by each bank’s share of credit with firm j in the previous 
period. Xjt represents a vector of firm characteristics, 
including the firm-specific credit demand shocks (λjt), 
as well as size dummies, the lagged loan-to-assets 
ratio, and lagged productivity. Finally, we also include a 
set of sector-year dummies.
Table 1 presents our estimates of the coefficient θ for 
employment growth, output growth, and investment 
over different subsamples. We find that aggregate 
economic conditions alter the effects of credit supply 
shocks on employment. For example, the estimated 
effect is not significant in the regression run for the 
expansion period of 2003-2007, but is positive and 
significant in the regressions run for the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009. In particular, our estimates 
suggest that in 2008-2009, an increase of one standard 
deviation in the credit supply shock is associated 
estimated by means of bank-specific fixed effects, as in 
Amiti and Weinstein (forthcoming). Crucially, our 
strategy allows us to identify time-varying credit supply 
shocks, which will be a key ingredient for identifying real 
effects of credit shocks that differ between expansions 
and recessions.
In order to assess the plausibility of the bank-year 
credit supply shocks , we divide our sample into 
healthy and weak banks, as in Bentolila et al. 
(forthcoming). Weak banks are those bailed out by 
the Spanish government in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, which were mainly savings banks 
(cajas de ahorros). The left panel of Figure 2 shows the 
year-by-year evolution of the average difference in 
credit supply shocks between healthy and weak banks 
as identified by the bank-year dummies . Weak 
banks had higher supply shocks until 2006 and lower 
afterwards, which coincides with the narrative in 
Bentolila et al. (forthcoming). We interpret this evolution 
as clear evidence in favor of the plausibility of our 
estimated bank supply shocks.
We also validate our estimates using loan applications 
from the Spanish CIR. If our identified bank-year-
specific credit shocks capture supply factors, a bank 
with a larger fixed effect should grant more loans. 
Loan application data enable us to test this 
hypothesis. We regress a loan granting dummy on the 
estimated bank-year shocks and a set of firm-year 
fixed effects to account for time-varying demand 
factors. Crucially, the bank-firm pairs used in this 
validation exercise are not used to estimate the bank-
year shocks because they are not included in the loan 
application data, which only report information on 
loan applications to non-current banks. The right 
panel of Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficient 
associated to the estimated bank-year fixed effects 
(credit supply shocks) for each year. The effect of the 
bank-specific shocks is always positive, significantly 
so over most of the sample, which we interpret as 
-0.12
-0.10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
AVERAGE (WEAK - HEALTHY) BANK SHOCK
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
VALIDATION OF THE ESTIMATED BANK CREDIT SUPPLY SHOCKS FIGURE 2
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
BANK SHOCK EFFECT ON LOAN GRANTING
90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 RESEaRCh updaTE, SpRiNg 2018
from purchases or sales of intermediate inputs by the 
directly hit firms to changes in factor and goods prices 
in general equilibrium (see Acemoglu et al. 2012).
We exploit our firm-level information, combined with 
data on input-output linkages, to study the 
propagation of our identified bank-credit supply 
shocks. Specifically, following Di Giovanni et al. 
(2018), we combine firm-specific measures of usage 
intensity of material inputs and domestic sales with 
the sector-level input-output (IO) matrix, as in Alfaro 
et al. (forthcoming). We use IO relations for Spain for 
both downstream propagation (shocks from suppliers) 
and upstream propagation (shocks from customers). In 
practice, we do this by augmenting our previous 
empirical specification with two additional firm-level 
regressors. DOWN measures the indirect shock 
received by a given firm j from its suppliers (downstream 
propagation) and UP proxies for the indirect shock 
received by a given firm j from its customers (upstream 
propagation).2 We thus consider the following 
empirical model:
                               (3)
If a negative credit supply shock hits firms operating in 
a given industry, the production in this industry will 
decrease, which is likely, in equilibrium, to make its 
output more expensive. Customer firms will then be 
forced to decrease production. DOWN is a proxy for this 
effect. In addition, when a negative credit supply shock 
hits firms operating in a given industry, their revenue 
and, hence, their demand for intermediate goods, is 
with a 0.5 pp. increase in the employment growth rate 
(column 2). The average annual change in firm-level 
employment for the 2008-2009 period was –2.17%, 
which implies that the estimated effect represents 18% 
of the mean change in absolute value.
The effects of credit supply shocks on output are 
always significant. However, the effect is particularly 
strong during the financial crisis of 2008-2009: an 
increase of one standard deviation in the shock 
implies an increase in output growth of 0.15 pp. 
(column 5), approximately 9% of the absolute value 
of the actual change in output over the period 
(–1.75%). Turning to investment, we find that the 
estimated coefficients are significant at 1% across all 
specifications. In terms of magnitude, we find that a 
one standard deviation increase in the credit supply 
shock generates an increase in investment rates that 
varies from 0.6 pp. to 0.8 pp. The magnitude of the 
effect varies across the different periods. For the 
expansion period (2003-2007), the estimated effect 
represents approximately 6% of the actual average 
investment rate of 12.89% over the period. The 
estimated effect represents around 12% of the average 
investment rate of 5.11% during the financial crisis. 
During the recession period (2010-2013), the effect 
more than doubled the average investment rate of 
0.59% observed in the data over those years.
propagation of credit shocks through input-output 
linkages
Firms not directly hit by a credit supply shock may be 
affected through buyer-supplier relations. For instance, 
if a supplier of firm j is hit by a negative credit supply 
shock, the reaction of this supplier may also affect 
production of firm j. The indirect effects of credit supply 
shocks can operate through various channels, 
NOTES: This table reports the effect of credit supply on employment, output and investment for the 2003-2007, 2008-2009, and 2010-2013 periods. 
Dependent variable is employment growth in % in columns (1)-(3); output growth in columns (4)-(6); and investment in columns (7)-(9). Credit Shock refers to the 
firm-specific credit supply shock of equation (2), normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. All regressions include industry-year fixed effects as well as 
the following controls: firm-specific credit demand shocks, size dummies, lagged loan-to-assets ratio, and lagged productivity. We denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% with *, **, and ***, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the main bank level are reported in parentheses.
(1)
2003-2007
(2)
2008-2009
(3)
2010-2013
(4)
2003-2007
(5)
2008-2009
(6)
2010-2013
(7)
2003-2007
(8)
2008-2009
(9)
2010-2013
Credit shock 0.251 0.503*** 0.243** 0.060** 0.152*** 0.109*** 0.821*** 0.625*** 0.711***
(s.e.) (0.153) (0.149) (0.111) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024) (0.173) (0.087) (0.080)
# obs 1,823.859 810.335 1,430.182 1,765.665 764.699 1,342.639 1,763.184 783.316 1,391.738
110.0610.0430.0240.0570.0040.0530.0550.0240.02R
tnemtsevnItuptuOtnemyolpmE
DIRECT REAL EFFECTS OF CREDIT SHOCKS BY PERIOD TABLE 1
2  DOWN and UP can be understood as weighted averages of 
credit supply shocks hitting suppliers and customers, 
respectively. Weights are given by the intensity of the 
relationship of each firm with its suppliers and customers based 
on the Spanish IO structure (see the working paper for details).
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with buyer-supplier relations subject to financial 
frictions, as in Bigio and La’o (2017). In particular, we 
aggregate our estimated credit supply shocks from the 
firm level to the industry level, in a way that makes 
them comparable over time. We then plug these 
shocks into the model and examine how they permeate 
the economy. We find that IO linkages significantly 
amplify the effects of credit supply shocks. The model 
predicts, for instance, that during the financial crisis, 
–0.60 pp. of annual employment growth between 2009 
and 2010 was due to a negative credit supply shock 
(actual growth was –3.28%), with –0.29 pp. due to 
direct effects, and –0.31 pp. to propagation effects. 
We also use the model to investigate the relative 
importance of each sector in accounting for the 
aggregate effects. In particular, we focus on 
the financial crisis period and compute counterfactual 
economies in which we only shock one industry at a 
time. Perhaps not surprisingly, the sector that 
generates the largest output drop is the real estate 
sector. Our model predicts that shocking just the real 
state sector would generate an aggregate output loss 
of 0.24%. While it was hit particularly strongly by the 
credit supply shock at the time of the crisis, real estate 
is also intensively used by other sectors. In fact, our 
model predicts that around 50% of the 0.24% loss is 
explained by propagation of the shock to other sectors. 
We also find that shocking other central sectors like 
electricity services or wholesale would also generate 
large output losses.
Conclusion
Using the quasi-census of firms' loans and economic 
activity for Spain and data on input-output linkages, we 
analyze the real effects of bank-lending shocks during 
the period 2003-2013. This period allows us to study 
likely to go down. This will affect their supplier industries, 
which will be forced to scale down production. UP 
proxies for this indirect shock.
Table 2 summarizes our main findings. Over the entire 
sample period 2003-2013, indirect credit shocks through 
IO propagation have a significant effect on the evolution 
of firm-level employment, output and investment. This 
effect is driven by the financial crisis period (2008-2009), 
where the downstream propagation effect systematically 
dominates in magnitude the direct effect of credit shocks. 
Note also that for employment and value added, the 
coefficients estimated for the boom period (2003-2007) 
and the financial crisis (2008-2009) differ significantly, 
with p-values below 0.1 for the null of equality, for both 
the direct and the downstream indirect effects. For the 
case of investment, coefficients are different only for 
the downstream indirect effect. However, the 
differences in the estimated effects for the financial 
crisis (2008-2009) and the recession (2010-2013) are 
not statistically significant in the case of investment. 
Finally, evidence of the importance of the upstream 
propagation shock is mixed.  Greater credit to a firm’s 
customers significantly stimulates that firm’s output, 
but does not have a significant impact on its 
employment or investment.
We perform several robustness tests of our findings. To 
ensure results are not driven by few observations, we 
restrict our sample of multi-bank firms to those with at 
least 5 banks per year. In order to account for bank-firm 
idiosyncratic factors, we include lagged exposure 
between bank i and firm j. We also consider two 
different subsamples for shock identification and real 
effects estimation.
Finally, the paper investigates the aggregate effects of 
financial shocks by using a general equilibrium model 
NOTES: This table presents a summary of the estimated indirect effects from equation (3). We focus on the effects estimated for the entire period (2003-2013) and 
the financial crisis (2008-2009) period. Mean annual growth (%) refers to the simple average annual growth rate of the variable as measured in our final sample of 
firms for a particular period. Credit Shock coefficient, DOWN coefficient, and UP coefficient refer to the estimated coefficients. We denote significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% with *, **, and ***, respectively. Coef /mean annual growth is simply the absolute value of the estimated coefficient divided by the mean annual growth (%).
(1)
2003-2013
(2)
2008-2009
(3)
2010-2013
(4)
2008-2009
(5)
2003-2013
(6)
2008-2009
Mean annual growth (%) 0.312 -2.764 0.508 -1.755 7.572 5.111
Credit shock coefficient 0.284*** 0.482*** 0.107*** 0.155*** 0.798*** 0.576***
Coef /mean annual growth 0.91 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.10 0.11
***362.1***096.0***646.0***453.0***796.0***103.0tneiciffeoc NWOD
Coef /mean annual growth 0.96 0.28 0.70 0.37 0.09 0.25
***902.0781.0-160.0tneiciffeoc PU 0.459*** 0.174 0.085
Coef /mean annual growth 0.19 0.60 0.41 0.26 0.02 0.02
tnemtsevnItuptuOEmployment
SUMMARY: DIRECT AND INDIRECT REAL EFFECTS OF CREDIT SHOCKS TABLE 2
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firms' responses to different shocks during times of 
boom (expansion) and bust (financial crisis and 
recession). 
Our results show that credit supply shocks affect the 
real economy through sizable direct and indirect effects 
on investment and output. Direct and indirect effects 
are quantitatively important during the financial crisis, 
but the impact cannot be generalized to other episodes. 
Overall, our results corroborate the importance of 
network effects in quantifying the real effects of credit 
shocks. More generally, our estimates show that the 
real effects of bank-lending shocks vary substantially 
between booms and busts.
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RECENT wORkiNg PAPERS
link to Working papErs pagE
norms in Bargaining: EVidEncE From goVErnmEnt 
Formation in spain
THOMAS FUJIWARA AND CARLOS SANz
WORKING PAPER Nº 1741
Theories of multilateral bargaining and coalition 
formation applied to legislatures predict that parties’ 
seat shares determine their bargaining power. We 
present findings that are difficult to reconcile with this 
prediction. We use data from 2,898 municipal Spanish 
elections in which two parties tie in the number of seats. 
The party with slightly more general election votes is 
substantially more likely to appoint the mayor (form the 
government). Since tied parties should, on average, 
have equal bargaining power, this identifies the effect of 
being the most voted due to a norm prescribing that 
“the most voted should form government.” The effect of 
being most voted is comparable in size to the effect 
of obtaining an additional seat. This norm binds behavior 
even when the second and third most voted parties can 
form a winning coalition that prefers the most voted not 
to appoint the mayor. Voters punish, in future elections, 
second most voted parties that appoint mayors, 
suggesting that they enforce the norm. We document a 
similar second-versus-third most voted effect and 
provide suggestive evidence of similar norms from 28 
national European parliaments. A model where elections 
play a dual role (aggregating information and disciplining 
incumbents) and different equilibria (norms) can occur 
is consistent with our results and yields additional 
predictions. 
gloBal imBalancEs From a stock pErspEctiVE
ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, ÁNGEL ESTRADA AND FRANCESCA VIANI
WORKING PAPER Nº 1742
After the recent crisis, a reduction was observed 
in global current account (“flow”) imbalances. Even so, 
global disequilibria as measured in terms of countries’ 
net foreign assets (“stock imbalances”) kept increasing. 
This paper discusses whether stock imbalances have a 
stabilising or destabilising impact on countries’ 
accumulation of external wealth. That is, do creditor 
economies, by virtue of their positive stock of net foreign 
assets, keep accumulating – everything else equal – 
external wealth? Do debtor countries, due to their 
negative net foreign assets position, keep accumulating 
external debt? Our results show that in debtor 
economies the existing stock of net debt helps to limit 
current account deficits, thus halting future debt 
accumulation. In creditor countries, however, the 
positive stock of net foreign assets contributes 
– everything else equal – to increase future current 
account surpluses, potentially leading to destabilising 
dynamics in wealth accumulation. This asymmetry 
between creditors and debtors holds in spite of the 
stabilising impact that net foreign assets have on the 
trade balance of creditor countries through real 
exchange rate fluctuations, and might have major 
implications for global trade and growth.
making room For thE nEEdy: thE crEdit-rEallocation 
EFFEcts oF thE EcB’s corporatE QE
óSCAR ARCE, RICARDO GIMENO AND SERGIO MAYORDOMO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1743
We analyse how the European Central Bank’s 
purchases of corporate bonds under its Corporate 
Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) affected the 
financing of Spanish non-financial firms. Our results 
show that the announcement of the CSPP in March 
2016 significantly raised firms’ propensity to issue 
CSPP-eligible bonds. The flipside was a drop in the 
demand for bank loans by these firms. This drop in 
the demand for credit by bond-issuers, which are 
usually large corporations, unchained a positive and 
significant side effect on the flow of new loans 
extended to – typically smaller – firms that do not issue 
bonds. Specifically, we find that around 78% of the 
drop in loans previously given to bond issuers was 
redirected to other companies, which led them to raise 
investment. This reallocation of credit was amplified 
by the ECB’s Targeted Longer Term Refinancing 
Operations (TLTRO).
puBlications 
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free up capital resources that can be redeployed in the 
form of new loans. Our study documents that the SF 
alleviates credit rationing for medium-sized firms that are 
eligible for the application of the SF but not for micro/
small firms. These results suggest that European banks 
were aware of this policy measure and optimized both 
their regulatory capital and their credit exposures by 
granting loans to the medium-sized firms, which are safer 
than micro/small firms.
crEdit shocks and thE EuropEan laBour markEt
KATALIN BODNÁR, LUDMILA FADEJEVA, MARCO HOEBERICHTS,  
MARIO IzQUIERDO PEINADO, CHRISTOPHE JADEAU AND ELIANA VIVIANO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1747
More than five years after the start of the Sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe, its impact on labour market outcomes is 
not clear. This paper aims to fill this gap. We use 
qualitative firm-level data for 24 European countries, 
collected within the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) of 
the ESCB. We first derive a set of indices measuring 
difficulties in accessing the credit market for the period 
2010-13. Second, we provide a description of the 
relationship between credit difficulties and changes in 
labour input both along the extensive and the intensive 
margins as well as on wages. We find strong and 
significant correlation between credit difficulties and 
adjustments along both the extensive and the intensive 
margin. In the presence of credit market difficulties, firms 
cut wages by reducing the variable part of wages. This 
evidence suggests that credit shocks can affect not only 
the real economy, but also nominal variables.
markoV-sWitching thrEE-pass rEgrEssion FiltEr
PIERRE GUÉRIN, DANILO LEIVA-LEON AND MASSIMILIANO MARCELLINO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1748
We introduce a new approach for the estimation of high-
dimensional factor models with regime-switching factor 
loadings by extending the linear three-pass regression 
filter to settings where parameters can vary according to 
Markov processes. The new method, denoted as 
Markov-switching three-pass regression filter (MS-
3PRF), is suitable for data sets with large cross-sectional 
dimensions, since estimation and inference are 
straightforward, as opposed to existing regime-switching 
factor models where computational complexity limits 
applicability to few variables. In a Monte Carlo experiment, 
we study the finite sample properties of the MS-3PRF 
and find that it performs favourably compared with 
alternative modelling approaches whenever there is 
structural instability in factor loadings. For empirical 
applications, we consider forecasting economic activity 
clustEring rEgional BusinEss cyclEs
M. D. GADEA-RIVAS, ANA GóMEz-LOSCOS AND EDUARDO BANDRÉS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1744
The aim of this paper is to show the usefulness of Finite 
Mixture Markov Models (FMMMs) for regional analysis. 
FMMMs combine clustering techniques and Markov 
Switching models, providing a powerful methodological 
framework to jointly obtain business cycle datings and 
clusters of regions that share similar business cycle 
characteristics. An illustration with European regional 
data shows the sound performance of the proposed 
method.
marriagE and hEalth: sElEction, protEction,  
and assortatiVE mating
NEzIH GUNER, YULIYA KULIKOVA AND JOAN LLULL
WORKING PAPER Nº 1745
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS), we analyze the health gap between married and 
unmarried individuals of working-age. Controlling for 
observables, we find a gap that peaks at 10 percentage 
points at ages 55-59 years. The marriage health gap is 
similar for men and women. If we allow for unobserved 
heterogeneity in innate health (permanent and age-
dependent), potentially correlated with timing and 
likelihood of marriage, we find that the effect of marriage 
on health disappears below age 40 years, while about 
5 percentage points difference between married and 
unmarried individuals remains at older ages (55-59 
years). This indicates that the observed gap is mainly 
driven by selection into marriage at younger ages, but 
there might be a protective effect of marriage at older 
ages. Exploring the mechanisms behind this result, we 
find that better innate health is associated with a higher 
probability of marriage and a lower probability of 
divorce, and there is strong assortative mating among 
couples by innate health. We also find that married 
individuals are more likely to have a healthier behavior 
compared to unmarried ones. Finally, we find that 
health insurance is critical for the beneficial effect 
of marriage.
did thE Bank capital rEliEF inducEd By thE supporting 
Factor EnhancE smE lEnding?
SERGIO MAYORDOMO AND MARíA RODRíGUEz-MORENO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1746
The introduction of the SME Supporting Factor (SF) 
allows banks to reduce capital requirements for credit 
risk on exposures to SME. This means that banks can 
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priVatE saVing. nEW cross-country EVidEncE BasEd  
on BayEsian tEchniQuEs
IGNACIO HERNANDO, IRENE PABLOS, DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA  
AND JAVIER VALLÉS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1802
The existing literature exhibits high uncertainty over 
the theoretical and empirical determinants of private 
world saving. This paper reports new evidence on the 
drivers of private saving by applying Bayesian 
techniques, using data from the world’s 35 largest 
economies in the period 1980-2012. After reviewing 
the main theories of consumption and saving decisions, 
and discussing the potential effects of different 
determinants, we specify a general model that 
incorporates the most commonly used factors in the 
literature, considering the potential endogeneity of 
some of the regressors. The Bayesian Model Averaging 
(BMA) approach summarises the information 
embedded in all combinations of the explanatory 
variables considered by averaging each specification 
according to its likelihood. We find that in the medium 
term private credit to GDP ratio, the government 
surplus to GDP ratio, the terms of trade, life expectancy 
and the old-age dependency ratio are key determinants 
of cross-country private saving behaviour. Lastly, we 
assess the long-term effect of expected demographic 
changes in private saving globally.
tErm structurE and rEal-timE lEarning
PABLO AGUILAR AND JESÚS VÁzQUEz
WORKING PAPER Nº 1803
This paper introduces the term structure of interest 
rates into a medium-scale DSGE model. This extension 
results in a multi-period forecasting model that is 
estimated under both adaptive learning and rational 
expectations. Term structure information enables us to 
characterize agents’ expectations in real time, which 
addresses an imperfect information issue mostly 
neglected in the adaptive learning literature. Relative 
to the rational expectations version, our estimated 
DSGE model under adaptive learning largely improves 
the model fit to the data, which include not just 
macroeconomic data but also the yield curve and the 
consumption growth and inflation forecasts reported 
in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Moreover, 
the estimation results show that most endogenous 
sources of aggregate persistence are dramatically 
undercut when adaptive learning based on multi-
period forecasting is incorporated through the term 
structure of interest rates.
and bilateral exchange rates, finding that the MS-3PRF 
approach is competitive in both cases.
dEcEntralizEd multinational Banks and risk taking: 
thE spanish ExpEriEncE in thE crisis
ISABEL ARGIMóN
WORKING PAPER Nº 1749
See Features section.
pErmissiBlE collatEral and accEss to FinancE: 
EVidEncE From a Quasi-natural ExpErimEnt
BING xU
WORKING PAPER Nº 1750
By allowing large classes of movable asstes to be used 
as collateral, the Property Law reform transformed the 
secured transactions in China. Difference-in-differences 
test show firms operating with ex-ante more movable 
assets expand access to bank credit and prolong debt 
maturity. However, the reform does not seem to improve 
the efficiency of credit allocation, as debt capacity of 
ex-ante low quality firms expands the most following 
the reform. Credit expansion also does not lead to 
better firm performance. These findings are not driven 
by confounding factors such as improvements in 
creditor and property rights protection. Our results also 
cannot be explained by other important reforms which 
were introduced around the same time as the 
introduction of the Property Law. These include anti-
tunneling and split-share reforms and amendments to 
the corporate tax structure in China. We conduct 
explicit robustness tests for these other reforms and 
hence contribute to the empirical literature on the 
reform process in China with new findings.
optimal dEnsity ForEcast comBinations
GERGELY AKOS GANICS
WORKING PAPER Nº 1751
See Features section.
thE impact oF high school Financial Education  
on Financial knoWlEdgE and choicEs: EVidEncE  
From a randomizEd trial in spain
OLYMPIA BOVER, LAURA HOSPIDO AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1801
See Features section. 
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Fiscal transFErs in a monEtary union With soVErEign risk
GUILHERME BANDEIRA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1807
This paper investigates the welfare and economic 
stabilization properties of a fiscal transfers scheme 
between members of a monetary union subject to 
sovereign spread shocks. The scheme, which consists 
of cross-country transfer rules triggered when 
sovereign spreads widen, is incorporated in a two-
country model with financial frictions. In particular, 
banks hold government bonds in their portfolios, being 
exposed to sovereign risk. When this increases, a drop 
bank’s equity value forces them to contract credit and 
to raise lending rates at the same time as they retain 
funds to build up their net worth. I show that, when 
domestic fiscal policy is not distortionary, fiscal 
transfers improve welfare and macroeconomic 
stability. This is because fiscal transfers can reduce 
banks’ exposure to government debt, freeing credit 
supply to the private sector. On the contrary, when 
domestic fiscal policy is distortionary, fiscal transfers 
cause welfare losses, despite stabilizing the economy. 
This result arises because the distortions caused by 
funding the scheme outweigh the positive effects of 
fiscal transfers in smoothing the adjustment of the 
economy hit by the shock.
crEdit constraints, Firm inVEstmEnt and groWth: 
EVidEncE From surVEy data
MIGUEL GARCíA-POSADA GóMEz
WORKING PAPER Nº 1808
We assess the impact of credit constraints on 
investment, inventories and other working capital and 
firm growth with a large panel of small and medium-
sized enterprises from 12 European countries for the 
period 2014-2016. The data come from the Survey on 
the access to finance of enterprises (SAFE), a survey 
that is especially designed to analyse the problems in 
the access to external finance of European SMEs. The 
key identification challenge is a potential reverse-
causality bias, as firms with poor investment and growth 
opportunities may have a higher probability of being 
credit constrained. We implement several strategies to 
overcome this obstacle: proxies for investment 
opportunities, lagged regressors, random effects and 
instrumental variables. Our findings suggest that credit 
constraints, both in bank financing and other financing 
(e.g. trade credit), have strong negative effects on 
investment in fixed assets, while the impact on firm 
growth and working capital is less robust.
intErnational co-moVEmEnts in rEcEssions
MORITz A. ROTH
WORKING PAPER Nº 1804
Business cycle correlations are state-dependent and 
higher in recessions than in expansions. In this paper, 
I suggest a mechanism to explain why this is the case. 
For this purpose, I build an international real business 
cycle model with occasionally binding constraints on 
capacity utilization which can account for state-
dependent cross-country correlations in GDP growth 
rates. The intuition is that firms can only use their 
machines up to a capacity ceiling. Therefore, in booms 
the growth of an individual economy can be dampened 
when the economy hits its capacity constraint. This 
creates an asymmetry that can spill-over to other 
economies, thereby creating state-dependent cross-
country correlations in GDP growth rates. Empirically, I 
successfully test for the presence of capacity 
constraints using data from the G7 advanced 
economies in a Bayesian threshold autoregressive 
(T-VAR) model. This finding supports capacity 
constraints as a prominent transmission channel of 
cross-country GDP asymmetries in recessions 
compared to expansions.
monEtary policy and thE assEt risk-taking channEl
ANGELA ABBATE AND DOMINIK THALER
WORKING PAPER Nº 1805 
See Features section.
monEy in spain. nEW historical statistics. 1830-1998
PABLO MARTíN-ACEÑA
WORKING PAPER Nº 1806
The purpose of this Working Paper is to present a 
reconstruction of the main monetary aggregates for 
the period 1830, when the first modern banknotes 
were issue, to1998, the last year before the substitution 
of the peseta by the euro. It offers series for currency 
in circulation and its components, bank deposits and 
its components, high-powered money and the money 
supply. With regard to previous monetary historical 
statistics, this Working Paper improves the quality and 
the time-span of the series, covering a period of more 
than 150 years. The Working Paper offers also a short 
approach to the long-term evolution of the quantity of 
money in Spain and the changes in its composition. 
The sources and methodology employed is explain 
in detail.
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EValuating thE macro-rEprEsEntatiVEnEss 
oF a Firm-lEVEl dataBasE: an application 
For thE spanish Economy
MIGUEL ALMUNIA, DAVID LóPEz-RODRíGUEz AND ENRIQUE 
MORAL-BENITO
OCCASIONAL PAPER Nº 1802
The availability of a firm-level database that represents the 
productive sector of an economy at the aggregate level 
is a necessary condition to undertake both reliable 
policy analysis and economic research in multiple 
areas. In this paper, we document the construction of a 
new representative firm-level dataset for Spain using 
detailed micro-level information provided by firms to 
the Spanish Commercial Registry and the Bank of 
Spain. A comparison with National Accounts figures 
serves to illustrate that the new micro-dataset is able to 
replicate the growth rates of output, employment and 
wage bill of the private sector. Using official statistics 
from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), we show 
that the resulting dataset covers more than 80% of 
firms registered in the census over the years 2000-
2013 and, more importantly, the resulting dataset 
replicates the firm size distribution of the Spanish non-
financial market economy. The same representativeness 
analysis is done for the manufacturing sector indicating 
that this sector is particularly well-represented in the 
dataset.
thE challEngEs oF puBlic dElEVEraging
PABLO HERNÁNDEz DE COS, DAVID LóPEz RODRíGUEz  
AND JAVIER J. PÉREz
OCCASIONAL PAPER Nº 1803
The government debt-to-GDP ratios in the majority of 
euro area economies, including Spain, are at very 
high levels according to the available historical 
records. Economic research is conclusive in pointing 
out that bearing high levels of public debt ratios for 
an extended period of time can be damaging for 
economic growth. The economic literature also 
concludes that sustained high debt ratios create a 
source of vulnerability for the economy, in addition to 
lessening the stabilisation capacity of the public 
budget. Against this background, the reform of both 
the European Stability Pact and the Spanish 
budgetary stability law during the recent crisis 
strengthened the role of public debt in the budgetary 
framework. The simulations performed in this paper 
show that, under plausible macroeconomic 
assumptions, the public deleveraging process 
required by the Sustainability Pact for Spain will still 
imply a significant fiscal consolidation effort that has 
to be sustained over time.
on thE dirEct and indirEct rEal EFFEcts oF crEdit 
supply shocks
LAURA ALFARO, MANUEL GARCíA-SANTANA AND  
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO
WORKING PAPER Nº 1809
See Features section.
Backing thE incumBEnt in diFFicult timEs:  
thE ElEctoral impact oF WildFirEs
ROBERTO RAMOS AND CARLOS SANz
WORKING PAPER Nº 1810
How do voters react to large shocks that are (mostly) 
outside the control of politicians? We address this 
question by studying the electoral effects of wildfires in 
Spain during 1983-2011. Using a difference-in-
difference strategy, we find that a large accidental fire 
up to nine months ahead of a local election increases 
the incumbent party’s vote share by almost 8 
percentage points. We find that a rally-behind-the-
leader effect best explains the results. A simple 
formalization of this mechanism yields an implication 
– that the effect should be larger for stronger (more 
voted) incumbents – that is supported by the data.
RECENT OCCASiONAL PAPERS
link to occasional papErs pagE
a short-tErm ForEcasting modEl For thE spanish 
Economy: gdp and its dEmand componEnts
ANA ARENCIBIA PAREJA, ANA GóMEz LOSCOS, MERCEDES DE LUIS 
LóPEz AND GABRIEL PÉREz QUIRóS
OCCASIONAL PAPER Nº 1801
This document describes the key aspects of the extended 
and revised version of Spain-STING (Spain, Short-Term 
INdicator of Growth), which is a tool used by the Banco 
de España for the short-term forecasting of the Spanish 
economy’s GDP and its demand components. Drawing 
on a broad set of indicators, several dynamic factor 
models are estimated. These models allow the forecasting 
of GDP, private consumption, public expenditure, 
investment in capital goods, construction investment, 
exports and imports in a consistent way. We assess the 
predictive power of the GDP and its demand components 
for the period 2005-2017. With regard to the GDP 
forecast, we find a slight improvement on the previous 
version of Spain-STING. As for the demand components, 
we show that our proposal is better than other possible 
time series models.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 RESEaRCh updaTE, SpRiNg 2018
although in 2015 fragility was still above pre-crisis 
levels. Moreover, greater vulnerability is observed to 
be concentrated among SMEs and, especially, in the 
construction sector. Given the continuation of the 
recovery over the two years following the cut-off date 
for the data used, the decline in fragility will foreseeably 
have continued into this more recent period.
Articles related to the First Financial Stability 
Conference of the Banco de España
The last four articles of Issue 33 of Financial Stability 
Journal are drawn from the First Financial Stability Con-
ference which the Banco de España organized jointly 
with the Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros 
(CEMFI) in May 2017 in Madrid in order to promote 
research and debate on matters related to financial 
stability. Participants at the conference included Mario 
Draghi, the President of the European Central Bank, 
and Luis M. Linde, the Governor of the Banco de 
España. The Conference was structured around six 
sessions in which twelve papers were presented and 
discussed, tackling subjects such as the role of 
macroprudential tools, the instruments available to 
address systemic risk, the trade-offs between different 
policy options and the efficiency of prudential policies in 
boosting credit growth in periods of economic weakness. 
A prominent event at the Conference was a panel 
discussion, chaired by Javier Suárez, of the book “The 
countercyclical provisions of the Banco de España, 
2000-2016”, which was published by the Banco de 
España and authored by Jesús Saurina and Carlos 
Trucharte. 
prEsEntation oF thE First conFErEncE on Financial 
staBility and oF thE panEl THE COUNTERCYCLICAL 
PROVISIONS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA, 2000-2016
RAFAEL REPULLO AND JESÚS SAURINA 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 33, NOVEMBER 2017, 55-58
This article summarises the general aim and content of 
the First Financial Stability Conference.
prEsEntation oF thE Book THE COUNTERCYCLICAL 
PROVISIONS OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA, 2000-2016
JESÚS SAURINA AND CARLOS TRUCHARTE 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 33, NOVEMBER 2017, 59-68
This article of discusses the history of countercyclical 
provisioning at the Banco de España, which pioneered 
the practice long before the macroprudential regulation 
of credit institutions became widespread. It highlights 
how provisions linked to credit growth can moderate 
FiNANCiAL STABiLiTy JOuRNAL
The Financial Stability Journal (Revista de Estabilidad 
Financiera) is a half-yearly journal published by the 
Banco de España that aims to act as a platform for 
communication and dialogue regarding issues related 
to financial stability, with a particular focus on prudential 
regulation and supervision. Its board of editors 
comprises internal and external professionals. All 
articles appearing in the journal, which may be authored 
by Banco de España staff or researchers from other 
institutions, are refereed by at least one member of the 
board of editors.
prEcisionEs dE la EBa En rElaciÓn con dEtErminados 
aspEctos dEl goBiErno corporatiVo dE las EntidadEs 
dE crÉdito
CARMEN ALONSO LEDESMA 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 33, NOVEMBER 2017, 9-34
This paper provides a legal assessment of recently 
published EBA guidelines on corporate governance of 
credit institutions (GL/2017/12 and GL/2017/11). These 
guidelines were issued by the EBA in September 2017 
in order to operationalize the requirements of Capital 
Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV), which adopted the 
Basel III bank regulation framework into European 
legislation. The author first discusses the broad 
objectives for corporate governance that motivate the 
extensive list of recommendations in the EBA 
guidelines. Furthermore, she considers the extra 
burden institutions face in accommodating these 
recommendations.  
la EVoluciÓn dE la Fragilidad FinanciEra 
dE las EmprEsas no FinanciEras EspaÑolas  
EntrE 2007 y 2015
ÁLVARO MENÉNDEz AND MARISTELA MULINO 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 33, NOVEMBER 2017, 35-54
The authors analyse the evolution of the degree of 
financial fragility of the Spanish non-financial corporate 
sector between 2007 and 2015 (the latest available year) 
on the basis of firms’ risk exposures. The study 
presents statistics on potentially vulnerable firms and 
measures of fragility, differentiating on the basis of firm 
size and sector, and assesses the relative significance 
of vulnerable companies, both in terms of their 
employment and their debt. The results show that the 
number of firms classified as potentially vulnerable, 
according to the criteria used, grew significantly during 
the crisis and fell in the years of economic recovery, 
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non-cognitiVE skills and indiVidual Earnings:  
nEW EVidEncE From piaac
B. ANGHEL AND P. BALART 
SERIES, JOURNAL OF THE SPANISH ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 
8 (4), NOVEMBER 2017, 417–473
JoBs For thE Boys? Exploring gEndEr BiasEd 
dirEctor’s sElEction
R. MATEOS DE CABO AND R. GIMENO 
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 
161, DECEMBER 2017, 82-85
macroprudEntial policy, countErcyclical  
Bank capital BuFFErs and crEdit supply:  
EVidEncE From thE spanish dynamic  
proVisioning ExpErimEnts
G. JIMÉNEz, S. ONGENA, J. L. PEYDRó AND J. SAURINA
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
125 (6), DECEMBER 2017, 2126-2177
hoW Firms BorroW in intErnational Bond markEts: 
sEcuritiEs rEgulation and markEt sEgmEntation
A. FUERTES AND J. M. SERENA
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE, 
26 (1), 2018, 135-169
disEntangling thE EFFEcts oF housEhold Financial 
constraints and risk proFilE on mortgagE ratEs
S. MAYORDOMO, S. CARBó-VALVERDE AND F. RODRíGUEz-FERNÁNDEz
JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, 
56 (1), JANUARY 2018, 76–100
uncoVEring thE hEtErogEnEous EFFEcts oF EcB 
unconVEntional monEtary policiEs across  
Euro arEa countriEs
P. BURRIEL AND A. GALESI
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 
101, JANUARY 2018, 210-229
cross-BordEr Banking on thE tWo sidEs oF thE 
atlantic: doEs it haVE an impact on Bank crisis 
managEmEnt?
MARíA J. NIETO AND LARRY WALL
JOURNAL OF BANK REGULATION, 
19 (1), JANUARY 2018, 4-17
both expansions and contractions of credit. It also 
underscores the impact of the Spanish provisions as 
an inspiration for the countercyclical capital buffer 
established by the Basel Committee in 2010 and as a 
forerunner of the expected-loss concept in the IFRS 9 
framework.
thE countErcyclical proVisions oF thE Banco 
dE EspaÑa, 2000-2016
PEDRO DUARTE NEVES 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 33, NOVEMBER 2017, 69-76
The author compares the Spanish countercyclical 
provisions with other, subsequent macroprudential 
instruments, such as the countercyclical capital buffer and 
the new provisioning framework introduced by IFRS 9.
countErcyclical proVisions, a partial ansWEr 
to disastEr myopia
RICHARD HERRING 
ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 33, NOVEMBER 2017, 77-89
The author discusses countercyclical provisioning as 
an antidote to managers’ myopia about rare but 
catastrophic events.
RECENT PuBLiCATiONS  
iN REFEREED JOuRNALS
los EFEctos En amÉrica latina dE las políticas 
monEtarias no conVEncionalEs dE Estados  
unidos
F. BORRALLO, I. HERNANDO AND J. VALLÉS 
MONETARIA, 
xxxVIII (2), JULY-DECEMBER 2016
EnVironmEntal policiEs and productiVity groWth: 
EVidEncE across industriEs and Firms
S. ALBRIzIO, T. KOzLUK AND V. zIPPERER
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 
81, JANUARY 2017, 209-226
intEgratEd modEl For short tErm ForEcasting  
oF thE spanish Economy (miprEd)
A. CUEVAS, E. M. QUILIS AND G. PÉREz QUIROS
REVISTA DE ECONOMíA APLICADA, 
74 (xxV), FALL 2017, 5-25
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las implicacionEs macroEconÓmicas y soBrE  
El sEctor Bancario dE la política monEtaria  
dEl BcE
O. ARCE AND A. DEL RíO
PAPELES DE ECONOMíA ESPAÑOLA, 
155, APRIL 2018, 10-18
inFlation and optimal monEtary policy in a modEl 
With Firm hEtErogEnEity and BErtrand compEtition
J. ANDRÉS AND P. BURRIEL
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 
103, APRIL 2018, 18-38
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D. LEIVA-LEóN AND M. CAMACHO
MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS
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I. ARGIMóN, M. DIETSCH AND A. ESTRADA
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
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A. GóMEz-LOSCOS, E. BANDRÉS AND M. D. GADEA
ECONOMIC LETTERS, 
162, JANUARY 2018, 171-176
discussion oF thE papEr “dEciding BEtWEEn 
altErnatiVE approachEs in macroEconomics”
G. PÉREz QUIRóS
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FORECASTING, 
34 (1) JANUARY-MARCH 2018, 139-141
EValuaciÓn macroEconÓmica dE las rEFormas 
impositiVas: aspEctos mEtodolÓgicos y algunas 
aplicacionEs
P. BURRIEL, D. LóPEz AND J. J. PÉREz 
PAPELES DE ECONOMíA ESPAÑOLA, 
154, FEBRUARY 2018, 265-288
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10 (1), FEBRUARY 2018, 1-38
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adJustmEnt programs? EVidEncE From thE Euro arEa
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Fiscal consolidation aFtEr thE grEat rEcEssion:  
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FEdErico pradEs prizE aWardEd to maría rodríguEz and 
sErgio mayordomo 
Banco de España economists María Rodríguez Moreno (DG 
Financial Stability) and Sergio Mayordomo of the ADG 
Economics and Research were the first winners of the 
Federico Prades Prize for Young Economists (Premio 
Federico Prades a Jóvenes Economistas), established by 
the Spanish Banking Association (Asociación Española de 
Banca, AEB). They were recognized for their study on the 
effects of bank capital regulations on lending to small and 
medium firms, entitled “Did the bank capital relief induced 
by the supporting factor enhance SME lending?”, which has 
been conditionally accepted for publication in the Journal of 
Financial Intermediation. Their paper was selected from 
among thirty-two submissions by academic and professional 
economists from all over the world. 
Prize announcement of Spanish Banking Association (AEB) >
Download Banco de España working Paper 1746 > 
RECENT CONFERENCES
link to conFErEncEs pagE
spain: From rEcoVEry to rEsiliEncE 
MADRID, 3 APRIL 2018 
The Banco de España and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) organized this conference, which examined Spain’s 
crisis responses and discussed policy options to ensure a 
sustained and inclusive economic path forward. 
Sessions:
1 Lowering fiscal vulnerabilities
2  Reducing high structural unemployment and labor 
market duality 
3 Raising Medium-term growth prospects 
4 Panel discussion: Completing the Banking Union
keynote speaker: David Lipton (IMF)
Link to conference website >
Fourth Joint rEsEarch Workshop 
MADRID, 10 APRIL 2017 
The Banco de España and the Centro de Estudios Monetarios 
y Financieros (CEMFI) held their fourth Joint Research 
Workshop on April 10, featuring recent work by economists 
of both institutions.
Speakers:
• Laura Hospido (Banco de España)
• Javier Suárez (CEMFI)
• Clodomiro Ferreiro (Banco de España)
• Enrique Sentana (CEMFI)
Fourth naBE intErnational symposium 
MADRID, 16-17 APRIL 2018 
The Banco de España hosted the 2018 edition of the 
International Symposium of the National Association of 
Business Economics (NABE), which was entitled “Global 
Recovery: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”. The Symposium 
addressed challenges faced by US and European businesses 
in today’s economy. 
Topics addressed included the future of banking and 
finance, inflation targets, automation and supply chains, tax 
reforms, and the future of trade.  
keynote speakers included Peter Praet (European Central 
Bank) and John Williams (Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco), and the conference was opened by Banco de 
España Governor Luis M. Linde.
Further information about the NABE conference is available 
at the following website: https://nabe.com/is2018
RECENT ECONOMiC RESEARCH 
SEMiNARS
link to sEminars pagE
loWEring WElFarE BEnEFits: intEndEd and unintEndEd 
consEQuEncEs For migrants and thEir FamiliEs
CHRISTIAN DUSTMAN 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON, 
4 OCTOBER 2017
nEWs and EVEnts
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COLEGIO UNIVERSITARIO DE ESTUDIOS FINANCIEROS (CUNEF), 
5 DECEMBER 2017
pEgging thE intErEst ratE on Bank rEsErVEs: a 
rEsolution oF nEW kEynEsian puzzlEs and paradoxEs 
OLIVIER LOISEL 
ÉCOLE NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DE L’ADMINISTRATION (ENSAE), 
13 DECEMBER 2017
contract cyclEs 
EFFROSYNI ADAMPOULOU  
BANCA D’ITALIA, 
18 DECEMBER 2017
WhatEVEr it takEs: cross-BordEr spilloVErs  
oF a maJor cEntral Bank intErVEntion
DAVID MARQUES  
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,  
21 FEBRUARY 2018
From WEBEr to kaFka: political instaBility  
and thE risE oF an inEFFiciEnt BurEaucracy
MASSIMO MORELLI 
BOCCONI UNIVERSITY, 
14 MARCH 2018
housing Booms and local spEnding
ALBERT SOLÉ-OLLÉ  
UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA, 
4 APRIL 2018
thE gloBal risE oF assEt pricEs and thE dEclinE  
oF thE laBor sharE
PEDRO TRIVIN  
UNIVERSITAT DE GIRONA, 
11 APRIL 2018
rElatiVE pricEs and sEctoral productiVity
MARGARIDA DUARTE  
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, 
18 APRIL 2018
stock rEturn comoVEmEnt WhEn inVEstors arE 
distractEd: morE, and morE homogEnEous
MICHAEL EHRMANN 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 
25 APRIL 2018
What do pEoplE Want?
MILES KIMBALL
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO BOULDER, 
6 OCTOBER 2017 
commodity shocks, Firm-lEVEl rEsponsEs and laBor 
markEt dynamics
SERGIO URzUA  
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, 
6 OCTOBER 2017
QuantilE Factor modEls
JESÚS GONzALO 
UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID, 
27 OCTOBER 2017
thE Fiscal-monEtary policy mix in thE Euro-arEa: 
challEngEs at thE zEro loWEr Bound
ATHANASIOS ORPHANIDES  
MIT SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, 
30 OCTOBER 2017
approximating EQuiliBria With Ex-post hEtErogEnEity 
and aggrEgatE risk 
ELISABETH PROEHL  
UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA, 
15 NOVEMBER 2017
VEnting out: Exports during a domEstic slump
POL ANTRAS  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 
16 NOVEMBER 2017
Fiscal consolidation programs and incomE inEQuality
PEDRO BRINCA   
NOVA SBE,  
22 NOVEMBER 2017
aggrEgating ElasticitiEs: intEnsiVE and ExtEnsiVE 
margins oF FEmalE laBour supply
VIRGINIA SANCHEz MARCOS 
UNIVERSIDAD DE CANTABRIA, 
29 NOVEMBER 2017
potEntial output, output gap and inFlation: EVidEncE 
From argEntina (2007-2015)
LUCIANO CAMPOS  
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Financial Analysis Division 
ADG Economics and Research 
MaRÍa ROdRÍguEZ-MORENO
Macroprudential Policy Division 
Financial Stability Department
pEoplE
ru: you are both quite young, but before joining the Banco 
de España in 2016 you already had substantial research 
experience, having spent time as academics at the univ. de 
navarra, and also at the cnmV (the spanish securities 
regulation authority) and at the European central Bank. 
please tell us about your professional background before 
you came to the Banco de España. 
Our previous work experience has given us insight 
into policy questions related to the regulation and 
functioning of financial markets (during the stage at 
the CNMV) and the banking sector (both at the ECB 
and now here at the Banco de España). Likewise, 
ever since our Ph.D. studies at Univ. Carlos III, our 
academic career has been devoted to understanding 
financial policy issues, such as the implementation 
of the Supporting Factor. And teaching was an 
excellent opportunity to learn how to communicate 
about these issues with a wider audience. 
ru: your work on empirical finance was recently recognized 
by the spanish Banking association (aEB), which awarded 
you the “Federico prades” prize for your study of policies to 
promote lending to small and medium enterprises within 
the context of European bank capital regulation. please tell 
us what the “smE supporting factor” is, what empirical 
strategy you pursued to analyze it, and what you discovered 
about its effects on bank lending. 
The SME supporting factor (SF) is a multiplicative 
factor that reduces capital requirements for loans to 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). It was 
introduced by the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR) for all European Union countries in January 
2014, except for Spain, which had already introduced 
the SF through national legislation in September 
2013. After the introduction of the SME SF, capital 
requirements for qualified credit risk exposures to 
SMEs (i.e., exposures of less than €1.5 million to 
firms with a turnover below €50 million) are multiplied 
by 0.7619. So banks need roughly 24% less capital 
for loans to smaller firms than they would need to 
make the same loans to larger firms.
The paper aims to provide evidence on the 
effectiveness of the SF. To this end, we employ the 
Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises 
(SAFE), which contains microdata on financial 
conditions for firms located in the European Union. 
We first compare the success of loan applications 
by SMEs and larger firms before and after the 
introduction of the SF, in order to evaluate how 
lending constraints changed under the SF. The 
results indicate an easing in credit constraints for 
medium-sized SMEs after the introduction of the SF, 
but not for micro/small firms.
As a complementary experiment, we conduct an 
analysis based on Spanish bank-firm matched 
microdata which enables us to: i) discard the effect 
of potential confounding events; ii) study how the 
effect of the SF depends on the bank’s capital ratios; 
and iii) perform a regression discontinuity analysis 
for a better estimation of the causal impact of the SF. 
All these analyses provide further evidence for the 
effectiveness of the SF.
All in all, our results suggest that banks do not treat 
SMEs as a homogeneous group — there are 
important fundamental differences across firms. 
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So perhaps regulation should accommodate these 
specificities, trying to loosen credit constraints 
not only to medium-sized but also to micro and 
small firms. 
ru: your paper on smEs is a great example of how better 
data and improved computer technologies are making it 
possible to study the effects of economic policies in more 
precise ways. could you discuss briefly how data have 
improved in recent years?
The key difference is that, nowadays, data are truly 
“granular”. In other words, instead of looking at 
aggregated data, it is often possible to look 
at specific transactions. That’s essential for better 
understanding the impact of policies because it 
allows researchers to isolate potential confounding 
effects. For example, in the paper on the SME SF, 
the use of the credit registry enables us to determine 
whether a given SME is effectively eligible for the 
application of the SF depending on the bank-firm 
credit exposure (i.e., only when the exposure is 
below €1.5 million). 
During the last ten years we have seen an amazing 
evolution in terms of data availability. This is partly 
due to the better regulation and transparency of 
financial markets but also to the fact that many 
institutions with proprietary datasets have opened 
this data to the researchers. Likewise for data related 
to firms or credit institutions. 
The other big innovation recently is that researchers 
are often able to merge very detailed datasets from 
different sources to contribute to a wider 
understanding of the whole picture. For example, for 
the SME paper we merged the credit registry data 
with balance sheet information, so we could control 
for other characteristics of the banks and the firms 
which are not recorded in the credit registry.
ru: another question that can be better understood with 
contemporary datasets is how monetary policy affects the 
economy. could you describe some results from your work 
on monetary policy transmission?
Sergio has recently worked with óscar Arce and 
Ricardo Gimeno to analyze the credit reallocation 
channel associated with the ECB’s corporate bond 
purchases programme (CSPP), which was one 
component of its quantitative easing (QE) policies. 
More specifically, the paper first documents the fact 
that eligible firms issued more bonds and likewise 
reduced their demand for bank loans when the CSPP 
was announced in March 2016. But beyond that 
direct effect, they were able to trace the credit 
reallocation effects through the economy. They 
observed that banks facing lower loan demand from 
bond issuers reallocated most of that available credit 
to other borrowers that were ineligible for the CSPP, 
including smaller firms, which then invested more. 
Again, measuring effects like these would be 
impossible without rich microdata on the actions of 
specific banks and firms.
Also, María has worked with Stefano Corradin to 
study the effect of ECB’s non-conventional monetary 
policies from an asset pricing perspective. They 
showed that  these policies affect the pricing of 
sovereign bonds in a way that violates the Law of One 
Price. Concretely, they find a monetary funding 
liquidity premium on those bonds that can be used as 
ECB collateral. This premium is especially valued in 
times of increasing sovereign credit spreads and 
increasing haircuts by central counterparties (CCPs). 
ru: another focus of your research has been systemic risk, in 
financial markets generally, and in the Eurozone context 
more specifically. please tell us about some of your findings.
The Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008 and the 
subsequent financial crisis made clear that systemic 
risk is a genuine threat, with potentially huge costs 
for the real economy. However, at that time, there 
was a lot of debate about how to measure systemic 
risk. Thus, Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) 
compared the performance of several models used 
to measure systemic risk and found that the simpler 
ones tend to outperform complex models. 
Another paper we wrote on systemic risk 
(Mayordomo, Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña, 2014) 
was motivated by the bad reputation of derivative 
instruments at that time. In fact, derivatives were 
described as “financial weapons of mass 
destruction” and a “potential time bomb” by Warren 
Buffett. Our results, based on banks’ holdings of 
five different classes of derivatives, document that 
their contribution to systemic risk played second 
fiddle in comparison with traditional banking 
activities. 
ru: last but not least, you are a professional couple with 
small children. you are also both researchers, and frequent 
co-authors. Would you mind talking for a moment about how 
you manage work/life balance?
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It is not so difficult to find the right balance 
between work and life with small children. We 
would say that children discipline you to manage 
your time, and to avoid losing sight of the line 
between work and life.
Finding a good co-author is a difficult task, maybe 
almost as hard as finding a spouse. Writing a paper is 
a medium-term project and so, apart from needing a 
person with complementary skills to yours, you need 
to feel comfortable and to trust the other person.
rEFErEncEs
ÁRCE O., R. GIMENO and S. MAYORDOMO (2017). 
“Making room for the needy: the credit reallocation 
effects of the ECB’s corporate QE.” Banco de 
España Working Paper 1743. 
CORRADIN S., and M. RODRíGUEz-MORENO 
(2017). “Violating the Law of One Price: the role of 
non-conventional monetary policy.” ECB Working 
Paper 1927.
MAYORDOMO S. and M. RODRíGUEz-MORENO 
(2017). “Did the bank capital relief induced by the 
supporting factor enhance SME lending?” Banco 
de España Working Paper 1743. Conditionally 
accepted, Journal of Financial Intermediation.
MAYORDOMO S., M. RODRíGUEz-MORENO and J. I. 
PEÑA (2014), “Derivatives holdings and systemic 
risk in the US banking sector.” Journal of Banking 
and Finance 45, 84-104.
RODRíGUEz-MORENO M., and J. I. PEÑA (2013). 
“Systemic risk measures: the simpler the 
better?” Journal of Banking and Finance 73, 
1817-1831.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 RESEaRCh updaTE, SpRiNg 2018
ViSiTiNg FELLOwS
ELIAS BENGTSSON is an Associate Professor at 
Halmstad University in Sweden. He received his 
PhD in Finance from Stockholm University. In terms 
of research, his publication record includes a large 
number of articles on financial regulation, policy 
and stability in a variety of internationally recognized 
academic journals. Elias has also held various 
positions outside academia, including Principal 
Economist at the ESRB Secretariat at the European 
Central Bank, Advisor at the central bank of Sweden 
and Senior Economist at the European Fund and 
Asset Management Association. In these roles, he 
has been involved in a variety of tasks relating to 
financial regulation, including the development 
EMANUELE TARANTINO is an Assistant Professor in 
Economics at the University of Mannheim, Germany, 
a research affiliate of the CEPR, and a member of 
the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy 
of the European Commission Chief Economist. He 
holds a PhD in Economics from the European 
University Institute (Florence) and, before joining 
the University of Mannheim, he was a “Franco 
Modigliani” Research Fellow at the University of 
Bologna. His research papers emphasize financial 
contracting, innovation and competition economics, 
and have been published in leading journals 
of Basel III and the European framework for 
macroprudential policy. 
During his stay at DG Estabilidad Financiera at the 
Banco de España, Elias is working on a project on 
the political economy of macroprudential policy. 
The project seeks to understand the effects of 
industry and political capture, as well as authorities’ 
institutional arrangements and resources, on 
macroprudential policy stances.
 
research page: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vt
dmxQ8aaaaJ&hl=sv&oi=ao
in economics and finance, like the Rand Journal of 
Economics, the Review of Financial Studies, and the 
Journal of Financial Economics. 
At the Banco de España, he will do further research 
in the area of financial economics, and in particular 
work on the link between lending standards and the 
composition of firms in the real economy over 
the cycle, and the relationship between trade credit 
and market structure. 
reseach page: https://sites.google.com/site/etarantino/
ELiaS BENgTSSON
Associate Professor
Halmstad University
EMaNuELE TaRaNTiNO
Assistant Professor
University of Mannheim
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JONATHAN HALKET is a Lecturer in Economics at 
the University of Essex in the United Kingdom and a 
Research Fellow for the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
and the Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice. 
His research addresses the fields of real estate 
finance, urban economics and macroeconomics. He 
earned a Ph.D. in Economics from New York 
University and a B.A. in Economics and Physics 
from Amherst College. 
His research while at the Banco de España focuses 
on local public finance and on household finance. 
His project on public finance uses an optimal 
taxation approach with private information and 
spatial geometry to understand the non-trivial 
tradeoffs between land taxes, income taxes and in-
kind transfers of housing (e.g. public housing). 
His work on household finance includes building a 
structural model of life-cycle consumption, savings 
and location profiles in an urban setting to examine 
how households jointly choose where to live and how 
much to save and how trends in homeownership 
and mortgage finance interact with trends in 
household labor supply and demographics.
reseach page: http://halket.com/
JONaThaN haLKET
Lecturer
University of Essex
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Finance Forum. This event will bring together academics, 
market practitioners and policy makers, and will 
combine more academically oriented sessions with a 
policy panel on the Capital Markets Union. It will cover 
various topics related to financial disintermediation, 
including: bank-based versus market-based financial 
systems, the interactions with monetary policy, the role 
of regulation, FinTech and the Capital Markets Union. 
https://www.suerf.org/
CALLS FOR PAPERS
iV sEminar in Economic history
MADRID, 11 OCTOBER 2018 
The Banco de España cordially invites submissions for 
its Fourth Seminar in Economic History, which will be 
held on October 11, 2018, at its central headquarters in 
Madrid.
The Seminar aims to bring together scholars from all 
over the world to discuss current academic work on 
Spanish or international economic history. Scholars are 
invited to submit their proposals before June 15, 2018.
call for papers (deadline 15 June 2018) >
risk, Volatility and cEntral Banks’ policiEs 
MADRID, 29-30 NOVEMBER 2018 
The Banco de España will organize a joint conference 
with the central Bank research association (cEBra) on 
“Risk, volatility and central banks’ policies”, on 29-30 
November 2018 in Madrid. The conference aims to 
cover a broad range of topics related to risk and 
volatility. The Banco de España and CEBRA chose this 
topic considering the growing awareness of the 
importance of risk and market volatility for both 
monetary policy and financial stability.
call for papers (deadline 15 may 2018) >
uPCOMiNg CONFERENCES
link to conFErEncEs pagE
FiFth World Bank – Banco dE EspaÑa rEsEarch 
conFErEncE
MADRID, 4-5 JUNE 2018
On June 4-5, the fifth joint Research Conference of the 
World Bank and the Banco de España will take place in 
Madrid. The conference, entitled “Macroeconomic 
Policies, Output Fluctuations, and Long-Term Growth”, 
will examine the effects of monetary and fiscal policies 
on the business cycle and on long-run labor productivity 
and growth. The geographical scope of the conference 
is global, but special consideration will be given to 
papers with applications to Europe, to emerging 
markets in general, or to Latin America in particular. 
conference webpage >
sEcond Banco dE EspaÑa annual rEsEarch conFErEncE: 
taxEs and transFErs 
MADRID, 3-4 SEPTEMBER 2018 
On September 3-4, the Banco de España will host its 
second Annual Research Conference, which will be 
jointly organized with the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(UK). At the conference, entitled “Taxes and Transfers”, 
leading academics will address a wide range of fiscal 
policy questions. The organizers are Olympia Bover 
(Banco de España), Richard Blundell (UCL), and Nezih 
Guner (CEMFI). 
conference webpage >
Financial disintErmEdiation and thE FuturE oF thE 
Banking sEctor 
MADRID, 30 OCTOBER 2018 
On October 30, the Banco de España will host a 
conference on “Financial Disintermediation and the 
Future of the Banking Sector”. The conference will be 
jointly organized with SUERF, the European Money and 
announcEmEnts
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